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ABSTRACT
This dissertation includes three essays that focus on a number of central themes in
public management and performance. Using American hospitals and nursing homes, I
explore how sector-differences matter in healthcare service delivery. I propose theoretical
frameworks on how managers respond to performance information in the cyclical process
and how they employ the information in their managerial decisions.
The three essays explore how public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations perform
differently in various performance dimensions, and how sector-differences leverage the
ways of utilizing performance information on managerial decisions, networking and strat-
egy. The first essay, Do Public Hospitals Outperform Nonprofit and For-profit Hospitals?,
indicates that sector-differences matter in organizational performance where a trade-off
relationship exists. The second essay, Help! I Need Somebody, provides evidence that
managers strategically choose networking nodes in response to performance information.
The third essay, Looking for Strategy in All the Wrong Place, reveals that performance
information shapes managerial strategy, either prospecting or defending, but the impact is
contingent on sectors. The findings contribute to public management literature that even if
organizations have similar functions, tasks, rules and clients, sector-differences influence
managerial decisions related to outcomes.
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HCAHPS Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems
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1. INTRODUCTION
This research focuses on the relationship between management and performance in
public, nonprofit and for-profit healthcare institutions. Specifically, three articles explore
1) how sector-differences matter in performance, 2) how performance information influ-
ences managerial practices, and 3) how sector-differences leverage the relationship. Two
streams of literature motivate this research.
Many public management scholars assert that public, nonprofit and for-profit organi-
zations are fundamentally different (Bozeman and Loveless 1987; Rainey and Bozeman
2000; Rainey 2009). Public organizations have different organizational structure, leader-
ship, tasks and functions relative to nonprofit and for-profit organizations. Moreover, per-
formance goals of public organizations, such as accountability, equity and responsiveness,
produce different incentives and evaluation systems, compared to nonprofit and for-profit
organizations. (Amirkhanyan, Kim and Lambright 2008; Backx, Carney and Gedajlovic
2002; Barbetta, Turati, and Zago 2007; Horn 1995; Chun and Rainey 2005). However,
other scholars in organization theory criticize that there is no difference among public,
nonprofit and for-profit organizations (Haas and Hall 1966; Pugh et al. 1969). They con-
tend that if organizations have the same practices of management, industries and prod-
ucts/services, the impact of sector-differences would be minimal. These conflicting argu-
ments around sector-differences bring up an important question of whether or not public,
nonprofit, and for-profit organizations are fundamentally different in management and per-
formance when they have similar functions, tasks, and clientele.
Public management literature indicates that management is a key determinant of or-
ganizational performance (Meier and O’Toole 2005; Vigoda-Gadot and Yuval 2003; Lee,
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Rainey and Chun 2009; Favero, Meier and O’Toole 2016; Milward and Provan 2003).
Managerial networking and strategy influences organizational outcomes since all man-
agerial activities affect organizational capacity to handle environmental uncertainty and
organizational constraints (Lynn, Heinrich and Lynn Jr 2000; Peters and Pierre 2000).
Empirical findings on these studies indicate that organizations have different managerial
networking, or strategy even if they have similar resources, structures, environments, and
process (Andrews et al. 2011; Milward 1996; Milward and Provan 2003). Variation in
managerial actions brings up an interesting question of, what drives managers to pursue
a certain type of management? Performance management literature assumes that, in a
cyclical process, managers try to employ perceived performance information in their man-
agerial actions (Moynihan and Pandey 2010). However, there is a lack of empirical studies
on how managers perceive performance information, and under what conditions managers
change their managerial practices in response to performance information.
Using U.S. hospital data in 2008-2009 and U.S. nursing home data in 2010-2012, this
research explores how managers react to performance feedback information when decid-
ing networking or strategy. This research also examines how sector-differences affect
management and performance in the context of healthcare services. The findings will
contribute to the understanding on the causal relationship between performance and man-
agement, and provide practical implications on U.S. healthcare systems.
The complex U.S. healthcare systems provide an interesting empirical context on man-
agerial decisions. The United States healthcare systems have multiple payers and players.
Healthcare managers need to make critical decisions on planning, strategy and network-
ing: managers must deal with multiple actors, such as physicians, insurance companies,
employers, and Medicaid/Medicare agencies in the processes of financing, insurance, de-
livery, and payments of services. Moreover, recent healthcare reforms, such as the Afford-
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able Care Act, make new threats, or opportunities, in healthcare markets, which pushes
healthcare managers to change their actions in order to increase efficiency and quality of
healthcare services. As healthcare reforms emphasize quality of healthcare services and
links reimbursement to quality, the question of how to employ performance information
based on healthcare quality is a key management issue in hospitals and nursing homes.
In the United States, healthcare is the most salient issue to the public policy makers
due to increasing expenditures and an aging society. In 2014, U.S. healthcare spending
grew 5.3 percent, to reach $3.0 trillion, or $9,523 per person (see National Health Ex-
penditures 2014). This expenditure is about 18.2% of total GDP, which will gradually
increases over the next decade. When looking at U.S. spending, hospital care and long-
term care are in a major spending category. In 2014, U.S. hospital spending reached
$971.8 billion. This spending is greater than other care services, such as home healthcare
and prescription drugs, combined. Due to increased coverage under the Affordable Care
Act, hospital care spending is projected to increase more, proportionally, in upcoming
years. Additionally, the proportion of total hospital services steeply increased in Medi-
caid and Medicare spending. Newly eligible enrollees under the Affordable Care Act have
increased national spending; the demand for hospital services will continue to increase
in next decade. Following hospital care, long-term care expenditures are another major
proportion of healthcare spending. Since long-term care has received a lot of public fund-
ing from Medicare (14%), Medicaid (43%) and other public programs (5%) (see National
Health Expenditures 2014), increasing long-term care demands have also become a major
concern in public policy.
An aging population also brings a lot of political attentions to hospital care and long-
term care. In the United States, the elderly population is gradually growing.The first Baby
Boomer generation reached 65 years of age in 2011, and their followers will hit 65 years of
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age in 2030. The percentage of the elderly population who are 65 and over is projected to
increase from 13% in 2001 to over 20 % in 2030 (Kinsella and Velkoff 2001). The increas-
ing number of elderly people over the age of 85 could be a major concern in hospital care
and long-term care, especially as they start to suffer from disabilities and chronic disease.
Due to decreasing fertility and marriage rates, limited kinship resources and the vertical
extension of family structure increase the future demand for long-term care services.
As such demands for healthcare services increase, the number of nonprofit and for-
profit hospitals and nursing homes is gradually increasing. In terms of hospitals, the non-
profit (58.3%) and for-profit (21.4%) sectors are larger relative to the public (20.4%) sector
hospitals in 2014. The number of private sector hospitals is gradually increasing since the
creation of the Affordable Care Act. Due to increasing financial pressures, many public
hospitals owned by federal, state or local governments have to privatize. Among pri-
vate hospitals, nonprofit hospitals are major healthcare providers. Managerial networking
among different actors is a salient issue since most nonprofit hospitals are owned by com-
munity associations or nongovernment organizations. Nonprofit hospitals have different
mission statements and payment systems: their primary mission is to serve the local com-
munity and their operating expenses are covered by endowments, donations, or third-party
reimbursement. Individuals, partnerships, or corporations operate the for-profit, propri-
etary, investor-owned hospitals. The goal of for-profit hospitals is to benefit the entity that
owns the hospitals, such as stockholders. As financial pressure of healthcare services in-
creases, for-profit hospitals have the highest growth rate relative to public and nonprofit
hospitals. An increase in the number of for-profit hospitals is linked to the growing num-
ber of inpatient beds and reduction in the average size (Shi and Singh 2014). This increase
indicates that for-profit hospitals are operated by physicians; they are physician-owned,
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speciality hospitals. Thus, different mission, payment systems and speciality across sec-
tors may produce different managerial actions and performance.
Nursing homes also have a large number of for-profit (69%) and nonprofit (25%)
organizations relative to public (6%) nursing homes. The growing number of nonprofit
and for-profit hospitals and nursing homes provides an interesting context to explore how
sector-differences matter in regards to the quality of healthcare services.
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and Hospital Consumer As-
sessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) provide good performance in-
dicators. In terms of hospitals, HCAHPS can be applied to all hospitals regardless of their
ownership, which makes it comprehensive to understand the quality of hospital care in
terms of consumer perspectives. Moreover, the American Hospital Association (AHA)
provides operating efficiency data across all registered U.S. hospitals that helps us to ex-
plore how public, nonprofit and for-profit hospitals perform differently in efficiency. Ad-
ditionally, U.S. nursing homes have comprehensive performance indicators, the number
of deficiencies and a 5-star-quality rating. CMS provides these standardized performance
indicators in order to allow residents to evaluate each nursing home in their community.
These indicators help managers utilize performance information in managerial decisions.
There are three articles that provide theoretical and empirical evidence that sector-
differences matter in management and performance. In my first article, I examine how
ownership shapes performance in various performance dimensions, while using American
hospitals as my basis. It is well-known that public-like organizations have multiple per-
formance goals, such as accountability, responsibility, equity, effectiveness and efficiency,
which are not always compatible. Public managers need to prioritize the competitive per-
formance goals in order to concentrate on a specific goal at the loss of others (Moynihan
2008b). This phenomenon indicates that by performing poorly in efficiency, public-like
5
organizations may be able to put their full effort toward achieving other performance goals
such as responsibility or equity. Amirkhanyan, Kim and Lambright (2008) provide empir-
ical evidence that public nursing homes do worse in effectiveness but do better in social
equity. Wheeler, Fadel and D’Aunno (1992) show that public abuse treatment centers do
better in equity, but at the loss of efficiency. These studies motivate the exploration of how
public, non-profit and for-profit hospitals perform in different performance dimensions
where a trade-off relationship exists. Using customer satisfaction and operating efficiency
as measures, I find that public and nonprofit managers are more likely to improve customer
satisfaction at the loss of operating efficiency, whereas, for-profit managers would rather
chase efficiency at the loss of customer satisfaction. My findings speak to the new pub-
lic management literature that it is necessary to revisit this trade-off relationship among
competing performance goals in the public service industry. Public organizations may
be more sensitive to policy-recipient satisfaction, which may compromise operating effi-
ciency. With consideration for the importance of customer satisfaction in soft policy, this
study contributes to the literature that sector-differences matter in improving the quality of
healthcare services.
In my second article, I seek to answer the question of how the use of performance in-
formation affects managerial networking while using American nursing homes as my em-
pirical context. Managerial networking involves the efforts of exploiting external oppor-
tunities and buffering potential risks (Meier and O’Toole 2011, p.i296). Existing research
provides evidence that personnel characteristics may affect networking behavior; and orga-
nizational characteristics such as centralization, formalization and specialization may limit
managerial ability to expand managerial networking. However, there are no prior studies
on how the use of performance information influences managerial networking. Since all
organizations have a cyclical process between management and performance, managers
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who perceive performance information generated through a performance feedback loop
evaluate whether their performance is satisfactory or not relative to their expectations, and
then employ that information when deciding which actors they have to contact more. Net-
working activities can be changed toward internal or external nodes depending on whether
they perform better or worse than expected. In this chapter, I theorize that managers who
perceive negative performance information are more likely to contact internal network-
ing nodes for ensuring internal efficiency, whereas managers with positive performance
information are more likely to contact external networking nodes in search of new op-
portunities. In the consideration of multiple principals and goals in organizations, I also
hypothesize that the direction and frequency of networking can be different depending on
which performance dimensions are used. Performance perspectives and dimensions pro-
duce dissimilar incentives and punishments, so managers will evaluate which performance
dimension that substantially affect their organizations differently. My findings support that
the impact of performance information on networking differs across performance dimen-
sions due to asymmetrical incentives and punishments. The findings reveal that managers
expect punishments for low-performance in regulatory indicators, and incentives for high-
performance on market-value indicators, therefore, research needs to consider which per-
formance dimensions are used when measuring performance information.
In the third article, I explore the cyclical processes between performance and man-
agerial strategy to answer questions of how performance information shapes managerial
strategy, and how the relationship between two is contingent on sectors. Existing literature
provides empirical evidence that the fit of managerial strategy coupled with environment,
structure and process is a key to improve organizational performance (Snow and Hrebiniak
1980; Miles, Snow and Sharfman 1993; Meier et al. 2007; Andrews, Boyne and Walker
2006). However, there is a lack of scholarship on how performance information influences
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managerial strategy in turn, and how this impact is contingent on sectors. I theorize that
the performance information– the performance gap relative to past performance or perfor-
mance of other competing organizations – influences managerial strategy. However, the
impact can be different across public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations due to dif-
ferent incentives, goal clarity and discretion. Public organizations can have invisible, un-
quantifiable, and hard to measure performance goals that may hinder managers to focus on
a certain performance information. Moreover, public organizations have less managerial
autonomy because of high red-tape and hierarchy in bureaucracy. The fewer economic and
promotional incentives there are in public organizations affect of the use of performance in
deciding on strategy may vary. Using American nursing homes as a measure, my findings
indicate that performance information shapes managerial strategy: positive performance
information (gains) motivates managers to adopt both prospecting and defending strate-
gies. However, the effect of performance information on strategy is only significant in the
for-profit sector where managers have a wider range of discretion, clearer goals and higher
economic incentives to expand market shares. My findings contribute to the literature on
performance management by the extent to which the use of performance information is
important to shape strategies, however, this relationship is contingent on sectors.
The three essays on management, performance and sector-difference will expand the
theoretical development for under what mechanisms public, nonprofit, and for-profit man-
agers use performance information on their managerial decisions. Moreover, the essays
provide empirical evidence on American healthcare institutions, hospitals and nursing
homes, on how sector-differences affect management and performance when delivering
healthcare services.
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2. DO PUBLIC HOSPITALS OUTPERFORM NONPROFIT AND FOR-PROFIT
HOSPITALS? OWNERSHIP, CUSTOMER SATISFACTION AND EFFICIENCY
IN U.S. HOSPITALS
2.1 Introduction
One of the enduring debates of public administration is whether public and private
organizations are fundamentally different in performance (Bozeman and Loveless 1987;
Rainey and Bozeman 2000; Rainey 2009). Many academics in public administration as-
sert that public organizations have distinctive organizational environments, hierarchical
structure, and political constraints (Rainey 2009). Other scholars in organizational theory,
however, criticize the notion that there is no difference between public and private organi-
zations in performance, and if any differences are found, they are attributed to size, tasks,
functions or structure rather than ownership (Haas and Hall 1966; Pugh et al. 1969).
Since the rise of demands for public services, the debate on the importance of sector-
difference in policy outcomes has also emerged in policy implementation. Nonprofit and
for-profit organizations dominate public service delivery across the country which is based
on the notion that they outperform the public sector in terms of efficiency and effectiveness
(Andrews et al. 2011). As the New Public Management (NPM) moves functions in public
agencies to private institutions, privatization, contracting-out and business management
practices are broadly applied in public service delivery. Healthcare is not an exception.
The healthcare industry in the United States has sufficient numbers of for-profit sector
healthcare providers competing against public sector providers (Goldstein and Naor 2005;
Alam, Elshafie and Jarjoura 2008). Apart from the for-profit sector, many nonprofit in-
stitutions have been emerging in healthcare service delivery, which contributes to a more
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blurred boundary between the public and private sectors. This trend brings important
unanswered questions on how ownership affects performance in different dimensions into
view.
Using American hospital data from 2008 to 2009, I will examine the effect of sector-
differences on performance, focusing on customer satisfaction and efficiency. Customer
satisfaction is the most important performance goal in hospitals since healthcare services
aim to transform clients themselves, rather than their environments. When clients are sat-
isfied with the level of healthcare service provided, an improved quality of service may
directly increase clients’ health conditions, achieving a desired outcome. Moreover, cus-
tomer satisfaction is highly linked to loyalty. People with higher customer satisfaction with
a certain hospital may be more likely to recommend another person to use this healthcare
facility, promoting the profitability of the facility. Therefore, many scholars in the health-
care system contend that customer satisfaction should be considered a critical performance
goal for hospitals (Berry and Parasuraman 1997; Heskett, Schlesinger et al. 1994) In the
context of the United States, many states require hospitals to incorporate customer satis-
faction in their strategic plans and performance goals (Andaleeb 1998).
Efficiency is another important goal in the healthcare service industry. All hospitals
are concerned about economic viability and profit margins leading to improved medical
technology and hospital care (Eldenburg et al. 2004). Particularly, nonprofit and for-profit
hospitals that have less governmental funds to operate are more sensitive to market compe-
tition, driving them to focus on economic efficiency to maximize profits. In this research,
I examine whether public hospitals outperform nonprofit and for-profit hospitals in differ-
ent performance dimensions, and if so, how the sector-differences matter in regards to the
trade-off relationships among performance goals.
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In the following sections, I will review existing literature on ownership and perfor-
mance, and introduce theoretical arguments on the impacts of ownership on customer
satisfaction and efficiency. After presenting my analysis and findings, I will discuss the
theoretical and practical implications of this study.
2.2 The Impact of Ownership on Customer Satisfaction
Ownership determines organizational structure, authority, goals, financing, markets,
and tasks that produce different performances (Rainey 2009; Rainey and Bozeman 2000;
Walker and Bozeman 2011; Meier and O’Toole 2011; Andrews, Boyne and Walker 2011).
Public-like organizations have a more complex political environments, which relates to
various performance goals such as accountability, responsiveness and efficiency. More-
over, public-like organizations are less likely to have performance-based incentive sys-
tems, that results in lower motivation to perform than business-like organizations (Backx,
Carney and Gedajlovic 2002; Barbetta, Turati and Zago 2007; Horn 1995; Chun and
Rainey 2005). Some studies, however, reject this argument that there is no difference
between public and private organizations in performance (Haas and Hall 1966; Pugh et al.
1969). The studies contend that if organizations are in the same industry and have similar
practices of management and products/services, the impact of sector-differences can be
minimal. The Clinton administration’s NPR, Total Quality Management and New Public
Management movement has also supported this notion. These movements have pushed
public organizations to adopt business management styles and performance-based man-
agement in order to ensure better performance. Although this debate is still ongoing,
empirical studies provide mixed evidence on the relationship between ownership and per-
formance (Bøgh Andersen and Blegvad 2006; Bartel and Harrison 2005; Bozeman and
Loveless 1987) and most studies focus on limited performance dimensions – efficiency or
effectiveness (Andrews, Boyne and Walker 2011).
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Customer satisfaction has been emerging as an important performance goal in soft
policies which aim to transform clients themselves. Soft policies, such as education or
healthcare, require substantial amounts of clients’ voluntary work, and motivation to be
actively involved in the service delivery process. When clients are satisfied with the qual-
ity of services, their satisfaction links to higher trust and efficacy that goes along with
being involved in a process that results in better policy outcomes. Empirical studies indi-
cate that higher customer satisfaction is linked to higher profits due to public willingness
to pay more for services from quality institutions (Andaleeb 1998; Boscarino 1992). Many
scholars also advocate customer satisfaction as an emerging key performance goal in pub-
lic service delivery (Hallowell 1996; Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Osborne and Plastrik
2000). However, it is still understudied how ownership matters in customer satisfaction.
Dahl and Lindblom (1953) contend that ownership makes a difference in customer sat-
isfaction because public, nonprofit and for-profit organizations have different constraints
imposed by political environments and market conditions. Profit-seeking organizations
that primarily rely on market conditions are sensitive to market fluctuation and clients’
demands for ensuring profitability. For-profit managers assume that customers with high
satisfaction are willing to revisit and recommend the organizations to others, which en-
sures future profits. Business literature support this notion that high customer satisfaction
in for-profit organizations increases customer loyalty, which generates more profit in turn
(Hallowell 1996; Heskett, Schlesinger et al. 1994; Goldstein and Naor 2005). Nonprofit
organizations, on the other hand, lack the simple performance goals, such as profitability or
increasing market shares, used by for-profit organizations. Nonprofit organizations have
different mission statements and goals that are more ambiguous and intangible (Forbes
1998), which makes nonprofit managers focus on longer-term benefits and social out-
comes rather than short-term customer satisfaction (Liao, Foreman and Sargeant 2001,
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p.259). In addition, nonprofit organizations have two different groups to serve: one that
supplies funding for activities, and one that consumes services and goods produced by the
organizations. Nonprofit managers anticipate that the first group will donate or participate
in fundraising as long as they aim to pursue their mission statements. Then, how about
public organizations? Niskanen (1979) contends that public managers are less likely to
prioritize customer satisfaction as a performance goal due to the fact that public organiza-
tions obtain revenues from taxation, not from fees paid directly by customers. Empirical
findings in business literature also indicates that customers are more satisfied with goods
and services provided by market-competing organizations, and are least satisfied with pub-
lic administration and government agencies (Fornell et al. 1996). Thus, different funding
sources and goal priorities may make public organizations less responsive to their clients’
demands.
Despite these competing arguments, there is a lack of empirical evidence on whether
ownership matters in customer satisfaction when public, nonprofit and for-profit organiza-
tions serve similar clients in the same industry. Fornell et al. (1996) compares customer
satisfaction across sectors, however, organizations in the empirical context have different
tasks, functions, services, and clients, making it difficult to differentiate whether the im-
pact comes from the sector-differences or different tasks. Chun and Rainey (2005) explore
the relationship between publicness and customer satisfaction, but this study measures
publicness as financial publicness and measures customer satisfaction as how managers in
U.S. federal agency recognize customer satisfaction as their key managerial goals using
survey responses from pubic managers. Thus, this study has a limitation because it cannot
capture all public, nonprofit and for-profit managers’ responses on customer service ori-
entation, and it does not measure the actual customer satisfaction that comes from clients’
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perspectives.1 Therefore, it is worth examining whether sector-differences matter in cus-
tomer satisfaction in public service delivery where public, nonprofit and for-profit sectors
pursue similar goals in the same industry.
2.3 Chasing Two Rabbits in the Bunch? Customer Satisfaction and Efficiency
Public organizations have more complex performance goals, such as accountability,
responsiveness, equity, openness, effectiveness and efficiency, relative to private organi-
zations. Multiple principals in public organizations, political authorities, upper-level gov-
ernment agencies, interest groups, and the public, impose different goals and interests on
the organizations, which makes it difficult for managers to prioritize performance goals.
Complex performance goals force managers to make a choice among competing perfor-
mance goals at the loss of others. Amirkhanyan, Kim and Lambright (2008) illustrate the
notion that various performance goals act as rabbits in the bunch. Just as catching rabbits
run off in different directions, in the bunches, public managers have to achieve competing
performance goals at the same time. Thus, if public organizations do better in one perfor-
mance dimension, they may not be able to enhance other performance dimensions at the
same time.
Among competing performance goals, customer satisfaction and operating efficiency
are not always compatible (Anderson, Fornell and Rust 1997; Heikkila¨ 2002). If an or-
ganization needs to concentrate on operating efficiency, managers try to downsize costs
and workforce size in order to increase cost-efficiency. However, fewer employees may
decrease customer satisfaction because clients need to wait much longer to discuss their
1Chun and Rainey (2005) use a survey questionnaire that asks to public managers about:1) In my orga-
nization, there are service goals aimed at meeting customer expectations, 2)In my organization, there are
well-defined systems for linking customers’ feedback and complaints to employees who can act on the in-
formation, and 3) In my organization, employees receive training and guidance in providing high quality
customer service. Though these questions can measure managerial practices focusing on customer service
orientations, they cannot provide information how clients are actually satisfied with quality/quantity of pub-
lic services.
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needs with a smaller number of employees. The smaller the investment in the service
delivery, there is a decrease in the quality of facilities and services. In healthcare, the
trade-off relationship between efficiency and customer satisfaction is a more salient is-
sue. Healthcare providers need a substantive amount of employees to provide high quality
services because most patients have specific diseases, issues, and needs to take care of in-
dividually. If a hospital decides to downsize the workforce and costs per patient, a smaller
workforce may have challenges meeting every patient’s needs, resulting in lower customer
satisfaction.
When two different performance goals are imposed to organizations, managers may
have different priorities to achieve each goal depending on its sector (Moynihan 2008b).
Ownership status determines organization’s priority among various performance goals,
such as profit maximization or customer satisfaction. Economic theory contends that for-
profit organizations differ from nonprofit or public organizations because of goal clarity
on profit maximization. For-profit managers are rewarded based on operating efficiency
(Wheeler, Fadel and D’Aunno 1992), however, nonprofit and public managers have less
incentive to increase efficiency due to a lack of goal clarity and a non-distribution of prof-
its (Chun and Rainey 2005; Hansmann 1987). Nonprofit or public managers are more
required to focus on public purpose. When public and nonprofit managers interact with
their social and political principals, they need to be sensitive to customer satisfaction as
one of key goals imposed by their principals. In addition to that, public managers are less
concerned about profitability than nonprofit managers because their financial resources
are publicly funded by taxes or government funds whereas nonprofit managers are more
concern with fundraising outside of their organizations. The relatively stable funding sys-
tem makes public managers meet the minimum requirement for operating efficiency, while
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also focusing on improving clients’ complaints, which may bring more positive social and
political attention.
2.4 Empirical Evidence from the U.S. Hospitals
American hospitals provide a good empirical context to examine how sector-differences
matter in performance. First, healthcare policy is an important soft policy. It aims to
transform clients by medical services. Hospitals need to consider customer satisfaction
as the top priority since it has a positive affect on clients’ health conditions, which is a
desired policy outcome. Customer satisfaction, additionally, includes how well patients
communicate with doctors and nurses and how they receive appropriate information from
staff, this may determine quality and quantity of healthcare services provided. Thus, it
is important to explore whether public, nonprofit, and for-profit hospitals have different
levels of customer satisfaction when delivering healthcare services. Since customer sat-
isfaction can vary across how much patients revisit facilities and how often they receive
services, this study focuses on discharged inpatient customer satisfaction that captures the
average satisfaction during patient stays in hospitals. Second, the American healthcare in-
dustry has a sufficient number of public, nonprofit, and for-profit hospitals, which compete
against each other for market shares (Goldstein and Naor 2005). Each hospital’s propo-
sition of revenue from government funding sources (e.g. Medicare and Medicaid) varies
across sectors: the average portion of Medicare in revenue is about 40%, but it varies
across the types of hospitals and ownerships. Third, many existing studies have examined
the impact of ownership on performance using American healthcare institutions including
American hospitals (Alexander and Lee 2006), American nursing homes (Amirkhanyan,
Kim and Lambright 2008), American mental health agencies (Clark, Dorwart and Epstein
1994) and American substance abuse treatment centers (Hausman and Neufeld 1991), but
these studies have only focused on the impact of ownership on effectiveness, efficiency, or
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equity. None of these studies explores the trade-off relationship between customer satis-
faction and efficiency. This study examines how public, nonprofit and for-profit hospitals
perform customer satisfaction
Hypothesis 1 Public hospitals will outperform nonprofit or for-profit hospitals in cus-
tomer satisfaction.
American hospitals have various performance goals, so it is important to test whether
public hospitals are more likely to achieve high customer satisfaction at the loss of other
performance goals. Particularly, when public hospitals spend more time with patients to
provide more information, the costs of taking care of one patient increase. After 1982, The
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) initiated hospital Medicare reimburse-
ment as a prospective payment system (PPS) based on diagnosis-related groups. Under
this payment system, hospitals can receive a reimbursement per admission according to
the patient’s diagnosis without considering the duration of the inpatient days. In order
to maximize profits, hospitals managers are motivated to constrain costs below the fixed
reimbursement amount as much as possible. Other payers and insurers also adopted PPS
methods to reimburse hospitals, which are more likely to lead hospital managers to min-
imize costs per bed, and reduce the length of stay after admission (Shi and Singh 2014).
Therefore, it is important to explore whether public hospitals are more likely to prioritize
customer satisfaction at the loss of operating efficiency and whether for-profit hospitals
focus on operating efficiency at the loss of customer satisfaction. It would be worth ex-
ploring whether nonprofit hospitals have a position between two sectors to make a balance
between customer satisfaction and efficiency.
Hypothesis 2 Public hospitals are more likely to promote customer satisfaction at the loss
of efficiency than nonprofit or for-profit hospitals.
17
2.5 Research Design
2.5.1 Data and Method
I use the American Hospital Association (AHA) database and Hospital Consumer As-
sessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) Survey for measuring owner-
ship and performance across American hospitals. The AHA database provides ownership
information and organizational characteristics for about 5,800 U.S. hospitals by years.
HCAHPS provides a standardized annual survey questionnaire, which allows access to a
patient’s satisfaction about health care received from hospitals. The Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the HCAHPS project team ensure credible and practi-
cal surveys. Respondents are randomly selected among discharged adult patients between
48 hours and six weeks after discharge. Hospitals are required to conduct surveys using
an approved survey vendor or collect their own HCAHPS approved by CMS. Each hos-
pital can choose from four different survey modes – mail, telephone, mail with telephone
follow-up, or active interactive voice response (using telephone keypads). CMS recom-
mends that hospitals achieve at least 300 survey responses from the sample of discharged
patients per year.
I use aggregated data by hospitals from 2008 to 2009 thatdoes not include pediatric,
psychiatric, or institutional (prison hospital, college infirmary) hospitals, hospitals which
have fewer than 100 respondents in their annual survey and hospitals which have survey
results based on less than 12 months of data. The total number of hospitals in the sample
is 995, 516 in 2008, and 479 in 2009. To control for cross-hospital and cross-time hetero-
geneity, I use Ordinary Least Squared regression with fixed effects for years and robust
standard errors. Since performance dimensions are correlated (Martin and Smith 2005),
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I conduct a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) analysis for the full model of each
customer satisfaction and efficiency. The descriptive analysis is noted in Appendix A.
2.5.2 Dependent Variables: Customer Satisfaction and Efficiency
Customer Satisfaction I measure customer satisfaction by patients’ perceptions on the
quality of healthcare that each hospital provides. HCAHPS asks 10 categorized questions
to patients based on the quality of hospitals and management, communication with doctors
and nurses, cleanliness, quietness, pain management, the responsiveness of hospital staff,
communication about medicines, discharge information, and overall rating of the hospi-
tals. I calculate the percentage of patients who are very satisfied with those categories,
then I conduct factor analysis and create the first factor as an indicator of overall customer
satisfaction as noted in the Table 2.1. The first factor loads positively, which indicates the
first factor is a general customer satisfaction measure.
Table 2.1: The Factor Analysis Result of Customer Satisfaction
Variable Loading
How often did doctors communicate well with patients? 0.8199
How often did nurses communicate well with patients? 0.9394
How do patients rate the hospital overall? 0.8663
Would patients recommend the hospital to friends and family? 0.7504
How often did patients receive help quickly from hospital staff? 0.8840
How often did staff explain about medicines before giving them to patients? 0.8461
How often was patient?s pain well controlled? 0.8658
How often was the area around patients? rooms kept quiet at night? 0.7007
How often were the patients? rooms and bathrooms kept clean? 0.7518
Were patients given information about what to do during their recovery at home? 0.5483
Eigenvalue 6.27
N 995
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Efficiency I measure efficiency through a reversed standardized ratio of hospital ex-
penses per bed. I divide total expenses by the total number of beds in a hospital, and then
calculate the reversed standardized ratio. Since the original value represents how much
more hospitals pay to manage one bed (high inefficiency), the reversed standardized ratio
is more convenient to see how much hospitals save relative to the average costs among
other hospitals. Thus, the reversed standardized index represents an operating efficiency
measure. Alexander and Lee (2006) use this measure as one of operational, strategic, and
financial performance. Although the number of sample is limited because of a lack of
information on total expenses in some hospitals, the model still has a relatively representa-
tive sample across sectors: 192 public, 742 nonprofit, and 61 for-profit sectors. Though the
model has less observations, the representative sample related to ownership provides an
interesting context to seek whether ownership makes a difference in operating efficiency.
2.5.3 Independent Variable: Ownership
I measure ownership based on three categories, public (government), nonprofit, and for
profit sectors. AHA data divides hospitals based on ownership information into four cat-
egories, government (nonfederal), nongovernment and investor-owned private 2. I merge
nonfederal and federal hospitals into one category for public hospitals and create three
dummy variables: public, nonprofit, and for-profit hospitals to make a category consistent
with existing literature (Wheeler, Fadel and D’Aunno 1992; Alam, Elshafie and Jarjoura
2008). The portion of public hospitals (19.30%) and for-profit hospitals (6.13%) are rel-
atively small compared to nonprofit hospitals (74.05%). The portion of hospitals in each
sector in the sample represents the population characteristics.
2In this sample, federal hospitals are not included. All governmental hospitals in this sample are owned
by state, county, city and city-county
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2.5.4 Control Variables
As control variables, I first measure organizational size as the number of outpatient
and emergency visits. Since the number of total beds has a high multicollinearity with
efficiency and managerial capacity, the number of outpatients can be a proxy measure of
organizational size. Organizational size is an important control variable since organization
theory literature contends that the impact of ownership can be misleading because of the
organizational size. Generally public organizations are larger than nonprofit or for-profit
sectors, so differences in performance can be derived from size, not by ownership. I
include log transformed inpatient size and outpatient size in the models to eliminate any
impact of size that could be a confounding variable in the ownership-performance link.
In terms of inpatient context, I controlled for the log transformed adjusted patient days
because the longer the duration of a patient stay, the patient receives healthcare services
could be related to customer satisfaction. The AHA database provides adjusted patient
days through the equation below:
Adjusted patient days=
Inpatient Days + (Inpatient Days * (Outpatient Revenue/Inpatient Revenue))
Besides size and organizational capacity, I include the percentage of full-time licensed
nurses among total nurses as a measure of managerial quality. If a hospital has a sub-
stantively large number of full-time licensed nurses, patients can be provided with more
information on medicine or treatments compared to hospitals that only have vocational
nurses. Moreover, nurses are street-level managers in healthcare institutions, so whether
they are qualified to serve patients in an appropriate manner is important to enhance cus-
tomer satisfaction and efficiency (Taylor and Baker 1994; Meier and O’Toole Jr 2002;
Vigoda-Gadot and Yuval 2003). I also control for organizational capacity that may in-
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crease customer satisfaction or operating efficiency. I calculate the ratio of physicians per
bed, the ratio of nurses per bed and the ratio of doctors per nurse as organizational capacity
indicators. I use the log transformation for all of these measures.
In terms of environmental factors, I control for market competition by accounting for
market share in the county (Johansen and Zhu 2014). Market share is defined as the
number of hospitals with specialties in the county. The underlying logic in this measure
is that with fewer hospitals in the county and in the specialty there will be lower levels of
market competition. The impact of market competition can also matter in the relationship
between ownership and performance, since hospitals with a higher level of competition
are more likely to be concerned about customer satisfaction. The market competition also
provides an interesting indicator,whether customers have various options to move from
one hospital to another if they were not satisfied with the quality of care received.
In terms of organizational structure, I measure whether a hospital is contracted and
networked. If hospitals are contract-managed, it is easier for them to obtain resources
(human or capital) and help from upper-level organizations. As Meier and O’Toole (2009)
indicate, the quantity and quality of resources are important to manage other environmental
shocks, and the ability to manage environmental risks is directly related to performance.
As with the variable for contracted hospitals, whether hospitals have strong networks with
other hospitals, or upper-level healthcare institutions, it is important for management of
environmental risks. If organizations are networked, it is easier to obtain resources or
information when they face difficult tasks (Meier and O’Toole 2003; O’Toole and Meier
1999). Here I measure networked- or contracted hospitals as dummy variables to control
for the effect of affiliation.
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2.6 Empirical Findings
To explore how sector-differences affect performance in different dimensions, I use
two performance dimensions, customer satisfaction and efficiency. Then, I examine whether
public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations have an outstanding performance in one di-
mension at the loss of others.
Table 2.2: The Impact of Ownership on Customer Satisfaction
DV:Customer Satisfaction 1.Basic 2.Size controls 3.Management controls 4.Full Model
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Nonprofit -0.306** -0.111 -0.115 -0.084
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
For-profit -0.595** -0.667** -0.646** -0.644**
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
yr2008 -0.112+ -0.121* -0.119* -0.121*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Log(total number of outpatients) -0.364** -0.408** -0.390**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Log(adjusted patient days) -0.058 -0.038 -0.043
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Log(doctors per bed) 0.907 0.958
(0.61) (0.61)
Log(nurses per bed) 0.179 0.168
(0.20) (0.20)
Log(doctors per nurse) -0.303 -0.331
(0.73) (0.74)
Skilled nurse -1.062* -1.129*
(0.52) (0.52)
Log(Market competition) 0.036*
(0.02)
Contracted hospitals (dummy) 0.211*
(0.11)
Networked Hospitals (dummy) -0.058
(0.06)
(constant) 0.323** 5.152** 5.672** 5.336**
(0.08) (0.55) (0.61) (0.61)
R-Squared overall 0.0246 0.1547 0.1634 0.1728
N 995 995 995 995
Note: Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. Public nursing homes are baseline.
Two-tailed tests of significance + p<0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 2.2 presents the customer satisfaction model with OLSmodel specification. Here
I employ nonprofit and for-profit hospitals as dummy variables and set public hospitals as
the baseline in the model. The findings support hypothesis 1 that ownership matters in
customer satisfaction: for-profit hospitals are less likely to increase customer satisfaction
than public hospitals, whereas public and nonprofit hospitals do not have significant differ-
ence in customer satisfaction. The findings are consistent and rigorous when I control for
organizational size, management and patient characteristic factors. It reveals that public
and nonprofit hospitals that rely on public fundings and various social desirable goals are
more concerned about customer satisfaction than market-driven hospitals. Even after con-
trolling for management and environment factors, the gaps between public and for-profit
hospitals on customer satisfaction exist.
In terms of controls, the smaller hospitals are more likely to increase customer sat-
isfaction and the larger number of nurses per bed is positively associated with customer
satisfaction. These finding indicates that customer satisfaction is highly related to the small
size hospitals and street-level managers, which may increase interaction between patients
and the street-level staffs. The high percentage of skilled nurses is negatively associated
with customer satisfaction. It reveals that nurses are concentrated on a higher structure for
supporting doctors rather than helping patients. The higher percentage of registered full
time nurses among total number of nurses reflects that there is a lack of street-level nurses
who can serve patients’ daily needs. The findings also indicate that contacted-hospitals
increase customer satisfaction. It indicates that more personnel or financial resources in
contracted hospitals benefit patients. The findings indicate that size, management, and
organizational environment influence customer satisfaction as the existing literature indi-
cates, but ownership still matters after controlling those factors.
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Table 2.3: The Impact of Ownership on Efficiency
DV:Efficiency 1.Basic 2.Size controls 3. Management controls 4.Full Model
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Nonprofit -0.214** -0.100 -0.115 -0.132+
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
For-profit 0.578** 0.547** 0.435** 0.417**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
yr2008 0.152* 0.147* 0.119* 0.120*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Log(total number of outpatients) -0.232** 0.191** 0.188**
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07)
Log(adjusted patient days) 0.008 -0.190** -0.193**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Log(doctors per bed) -1.561 -1.567
(1.03) (1.02)
Log(nurses per bed) -1.763** -1.770**
(0.24) (0.24)
Log(doctors per nurse) -2.009+ -2.037+
(1.10) (1.11)
Skilled nurse 1.391* 1.318*
(0.56) (0.57)
Log(Market competition) 0.017
(0.02)
Contracted hospitals (dummy) -0.049
(0.09)
Networked Hospitals (dummy) 0.102+
(0.05)
(constant) 0.077 2.643** 0.895 0.890
(0.08) (0.58) (0.58) (0.60)
R-Squared overall 0.0464 0.0921 0.2843 0.2879
N 995 995 995 995
Note: Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. Public nursing homes are baseline.
Two-tailed tests of significance + p<0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 2.3 shows how ownership influences efficiency: I measure efficiency as a re-
versed standardized ratio of total expenses to beds, so a high value in efficiency means
spending less money to operate a bed or a high operating efficiency. The models sup-
port hypothesis 2 that for-profit hospitals are more likely to increase efficiency relative to
public hospitals, but nonprofit hospitals are less likely to increase efficiency compared to
public hospitals. This finding is consistent across all models. Table 2.4 indicates SUR
model specification for each performance dimension. It shows consistent results that for-
profit hospitals are more likely to focus on operating efficiency at the loss of customer
satisfaction relative to public hospitals. Nonprofit hospitals do not show significant differ-
ences in customer satisfaction with public hospitals, but they perform worse in efficiency.
A comparison of the customer satisfaction model with the efficiency model gives inter-
esting evidence that public-like hospitals do better in customer satisfaction but worse in
efficiency relative to business-like hospitals. It indicates that public and nonprofit hospital
managers who have various performance goals need to make a choice among competi-
tive performance goals in order to concentrate on specific performance goals. Therefore,
which goals public and nonprofit hospital managers choose first and why they do are more
important questions to answer.
Meier and O’Toole (2003) contend that there is an autoregressive relationship between
management and performance: performance in the current year (t) is highly correlated
with past performance (t-1), so it is necessary to test whether the impact of management
is still significant after controlling for past performance. Ownership affects organizational
stability, structure and managerial styles, so it is necessary to test for an autoregressive re-
lationship between ownership and performance as well by controlling for past performance
(t-1). As noted in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6, autoregressive models in customer satisfaction
do not show a significant relationship between ownership and customer satisfaction, how-
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Table 2.4: SUR Regression Models: The Impact of Ownership on Satisfaction versus
Efficiency
Customer satisfaction Efficiency
b/se b/se
Nonprofit -0.084 -0.132+
(0.08) (0.07)
For-profit -0.644** 0.417**
(0.14) (0.12)
Log(total number of outpatients) -0.390** 0.188**
(0.05) (0.05)
Log(adjusted patient days) -0.043 -0.193**
(0.06) (0.05)
Log(doctors per bed) 0.958 -1.567*
(0.68) (0.62)
Log(nurses per bed) 0.168 -1.770**
(0.19) (0.17)
Log(doctors per nurse) -0.331 -2.037**
(0.75) (0.68)
Skilled nurse -1.129* 1.338**
(0.51) (0.47)
Log(Market competition) 0.036* 0.017
(0.02) (0.01)
Contracted hospitals (dummy) 0.211* -0.049
(0.10) (0.09)
Networked Hospitals (dummy) -0.058 0.102+
(0.06) (0.06)
yr2008 -0.121* 0.120*
(0.06) (0.05)
(constant) 5.336** 0.890+
(0.55) (0.51)
R-Squared overall 0.1728
N 995
Note: Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. Public nursing homes are baseline.
Two-tailed tests of significance + p<0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 2.5: The Impact of Ownership on Customer Satisfaction: Autoregressive Model
DV:Customer Satisfaction 1.Basic 2.Size controls 3.Management controls 4.Full Model
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Lagged customer satisfaction 0.864** 0.852** 0.851** 0.851**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Nonprofit 0.024 0.036 0.048 0.040
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
For-profit 0.121 0.110 0.111 0.097
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Log(total number of outpatients) -0.033 -0.078* -0.080+
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Log(adjusted patient days) 0.003 0.025 0.024
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Log(doctors per bed) 0.265 0.246
(0.47) (0.48)
Log(nurses per bed) 0.155 0.148
(0.14) (0.14)
Log(doctors per nurse) -0.217 -0.164
(0.57) (0.59)
Skilled nurse 0.016 0.012
(0.43) (0.44)
Log(Market competition) 0.015
(0.01)
Contracted hospitals (dummy) -0.068
(0.08)
Networked Hospitals (dummy) 0.004
(0.05)
(constant) 0.083+ 0.438 0.585 0.557
(0.05) (0.40) (0.42) (0.43)
R-Squared overall 0.7918 0.7926 0.7940 0.7952
N 400 400 400 400
Note: Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. Public nursing homes are baseline.
Two-tailed tests of significance + p<0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 2.6: The Impact of Ownership on Efficiency: Autoregressive Model
DV:Efficiency 1.Basic 2.Size controls 3.Management controls 4.Full Model
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Lagged efficiency 1.042** 1.040** 1.013** 1.010**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Nonprofit -0.068+ -0.066+ -0.082+ -0.092*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
For-profit -0.022 -0.019 -0.015 -0.019
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Log(total number of outpatients) -0.009 0.040+ 0.039
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Log(adjusted patient days) 0.011 -0.017 -0.019
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Log(doctors per bed) -0.899 -0.892
(0.56) (0.54)
Log(nurses per bed) -0.114 -0.119
(0.12) (0.12)
Log(doctors per nurse) 0.666 0.617
(0.56) (0.54)
Skilled nurse 0.007 -0.044
(0.31) (0.32)
Log(Market competition) 0.003
(0.01)
Contracted hospitals (dummy) -0.035
(0.04)
Networked Hospitals (dummy) 0.061*
(0.03)
(constant) -0.072* -0.086 -0.255 -0.205
(0.04) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
R-Squared overall 0.9143 0.9143 0.9175 0.9187
N 400 400 400 400
Note: Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. Public nursing homes are baseline.
Two-tailed tests of significance + p<0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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ever, autoregressive model in efficiency indicates that nonprofit hospitals perform worse
in efficiency relative to public hospitals. This findings provide more rigorous evidence
that ownership matters in explaining performance, especially in operating efficiency. Af-
ter controlling types of services, size and staff quality, the findings indicate that public
hospitals do better than nonprofit hospitals in efficiency.
Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 allow us to compare the results of the impact of ownership
on each performance goal separately, but it does not show whether managers pursue one
goal over another. When performance goals are competing each other, the trade-off rela-
tionship makes managers sacrifice one goal to achieve another one. If public and nonprofit
organizations perform worse than for-profit organizations in operating efficiency, it may be
derived from their managerial priority on other performance goals, such as customer sat-
isfaction. On the contrary to for-profit organizations, public and nonprofit organizations
have less incentives to increase cost-efficiency in operation for a profit in a short-term
period. This lack of incentive and motivation may shift their managerial strategy from ef-
ficiency to customer satisfaction, which may bring more rewards from public and political
entities.
To test their trade-off relationship, I analyze the impact of ownership on customer sat-
isfaction with the addition of efficiency as a control variable as noted in Table 2.7. Though
the number of observations is different between the basic model and the new model, it
gives empirical evidence that efficiency has a trade-off relationship with customer satis-
faction. Efficiency is negatively associated with customer satisfaction, which means that a
larger amount of operating costs for taking care of patients may be needed to increase cus-
tomer satisfaction. When hospital managers need to choose one competing performance
goal at the cost of others, public and nonprofit managers are more likely to focus on cus-
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Table 2.7: The Trade-off Relationship between Customer Satisfaction and Efficiency
DV:Customer Satisfaction Basic Model New model
b/se b/se
Nonprofit -0.084 -0.095
(0.08) (0.08)
For-profit -0.644** -0.608**
(0.15) (0.15)
Log(total number of outpatients) -0.390** -0.373**
(0.06) (0.06)
Log(adjusted patient days) -0.043 -0.060
(0.06) (0.06)
Log(doctors per bed) 0.958 0.820
(0.61) (0.62)
Log(nurses per bed) 0.168 0.013
(0.20) (0.20)
Log(doctors per nurse) -0.331 -0.510
(0.74) (0.74)
Skilled nurse -1.129* -1.013+
(0.52) (0.52)
Log(Market competition) 0.036* 0.037*
(0.02) (0.02)
Contracted hospitals (dummy) 0.211* 0.206*
(0.11) (0.10)
Networked Hospitals (dummy) -0.058 -0.049
(0.06) (0.06)
yr2008 -0.121* -0.110+
(0.06) (0.06)
Standardized efficiency -0.088*
(0.04)
(constant) 5.336** 5.414**
(0.61) (0.62)
R-Squared overall 0.1728 0.1781
N 995 995
Note: Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. Public nursing homes are baseline.
Two-tailed tests of significance + p<0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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tomer satisfaction, whereas for-profit managers choose efficiency at the lost of customer
satisfaction.
2.7 Conclusion
Ownership is an important key factor that determines organizational structure, man-
agerial styles and tasks/functions. However, there is still ongoing debate on whether own-
ership matters in performance. Existing literature indicates that there are controversial
arguments on the impact of ownership on performance. Empirical studies also provide
mixed evidence on the impact of performance based on effectiveness or efficiency (Rainey
and Bozeman 2000; Rainey 2009; Andrews et al. 2011). Using American hospital data, I
focus on customer satisfaction as a key performance goal in healthcare service delivery. I
revisit the theoretical argument on how public, nonprofit, and for-profit managers perform
differently in customer satisfaction relative to efficiency. The findings indicate that pub-
lic and nonprofit managers are more likely to improve customer satisfaction at the loss of
efficiency whereas for-profit managers focus on efficiency at the loss of customer satis-
faction. The findings contribute to the theoretical arguments on the impact of ownership
using multiple performance dimension. It also sheds a new light on how ownership forces
managers to focus on one performance goal over others when performance goals are not
compatible.
For the next steps, it is worthwhile to examine how managerial networking affects per-
formance goal priority and how the impact differs across public, nonprofit, and for-profit
hospitals. The findings of this study support public service motivation theory that em-
phasizes the importance of individual prepositions on public value and public demands.
If public and nonprofit managers are more likely to care about customer satisfaction than
for-profit managers, how managers meet and how frequently they meet can reflect individ-
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ual managerial prepositions and strategic decisions more clearly. Moreover, managerial
networking shows how public, nonprofit and for-profit managers respond to external op-
portunities or potential risk (O’Toole and Meier 2004a,b).
Another question to be answered is how public and nonprofit managers perform dif-
ferently. The findings of this study imply that there is no difference between public and
nonprofit hospitals in customer satisfaction and efficiency when controlling organizational
and environmental factors. Existing nonprofit literature, however, indicates that compen-
sation levels, salaries and incentive systems make substantive differences in the behavior
of public and nonprofit organizations (Roomkin andWeisbrod 1999; Weisbrod 1997). Par-
ticularly, nonprofit hospitals may have distinctive characteristics that make a difference to
private-for-profit and governmental hospitals. Future studies need to look into nonprofit
hospitals with consideration for personnel, organizational, and environmental characteris-
tics.
In terms of practical implications, this study provides evidence that public and non-
profit hospitals do better in communicating patients, cleanliness, quietness, and respon-
siveness. It indicates that public and nonprofit hospitals are more likely to pay attention
to the quality of healthcare services on clients’ perspectives. This finding is consistent
with the existing studies on American nursing homes (Amirkhanyan, Kim and Lambright
2008). It allows us to consider under what conditions public and nonprofit hospitals do
better in customer satisfaction: do they have a higher financial security, or do they have
different patient characteristics? With consideration for the importance of customer sat-
isfaction for better policy outcomes, these questions should be answered to improve the
quality of healthcare services.
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3. HELP! I NEED SOMEBODY: PERFORMANCE INFORMATION AND
MANAGERIAL NETWORKING IN U.S. NURSING HOMES
3.1 Introduction
Managerial networking has received attention from scholars in public management
based on the notion that it affects organizational performance (Agranoff and McGuire
2004; O’Toole and Meier 2003, 2004b, 2011; Juenke 2005). In uncertain environments,
public managers need to collaborate with multiple stakeholders and organizations to im-
prove public service quality (Lynn, Heinrich and Lynn Jr 2000; Peters and Pierre 2000).
Managers in charge of public service delivery need to make strategic decisions on which
actors they contact in order to obtain necessary resources, such as political support, mon-
etary resources and information. Through this voluntary interaction, managers can exploit
opportunities or buffer risks when they face environmental uncertainty, resulting in better
policy outcomes. Existing literature provides theoretical and empirical evidence that man-
agerial networking positively influences organizational performance (O’Toole, Meier and
Nicholson-Crotty 2005; O’Toole and Meier 2003).
Despite the importance of managerial networking, the determinants of managerial net-
working are rarely studied.(Andrews et al. 2011; Milward 1996; Milward and Provan
2003). A few studies provide empirical evidence that personnel or organizational charac-
teristics generate different networking patterns, however, little is known as to how perfor-
mance information affects managerial networking. Managers closely monitor performance
and evaluate whether it is satisfactory or not relative to a reference point. In the cyclical
process, managers may employ such performance information when deciding on which
actors they should contact more. When their performance does not fulfill expectations,
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managers may increase internal networking to closely monitor the work process. Man-
agers in higher performing organizations may try to exploit the opportunity by networking
with external nodes more often. O’Toole, Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2005, p.66), for
example, contended that low-performing schools received a great deal of political attention
and these performance pressures induced managers to contact upward networking nodes
(e.g. school board) more often, however, this proposition still remains untested.
This research explores how performance information shapes managerial networking.
In the classic book, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Cyert and March (1963) empha-
size performance feedback in competitive markets such that managers in firms evaluate
their goal attainment relative to their expectations, and then employ the information to
make managerial decisions. If managerial networking enhances performance, then how
do managers choose to network with particular actors in response to performance infor-
mation? This question is important for understanding the underlying mechanisms in the
networking-performance cyclical process. I theorize that managers who perceive nega-
tive performance information (loss) are more likely to contact internal networking nodes,
whereas managers perceived positive performance information (gain) are willing to con-
tact external networking nodes in search of new niches using their slack-resources. In the
consideration of multiple goals in organizations, I also hypothesize that the direction and
frequency of networking can be different depending on which performance dimensions are
used for obtaining performance information. Different performance dimensions produce
dissimilar incentives and punishments, which make managers estimate the carrots or sticks
that substantially affect their organizations.
This study of managerial decisions concerning network action will examine the nurs-
ing home industry in the United States. The U.S. nursing home industry provides a good
empirical context because it has been provided by public, nonprofit and for-profit organiza-
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tions and has a performance appraisal system that applies various performance indicators
applied to all homes. Since most public services in public health are delivered by for-profit
or non-profit organizations, and only a few of them are solely handled by public organiza-
tions,1 this broad context allows us to explore how public, nonprofit, and for-profit man-
agers network (Agranoff 2007; Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan 1997). The nursing home
industry is characterized by imperfectly competitive markets; in 2012, nursing homes were
mostly funded by Medicaid (61%), other public (4.7%), out-of-pocket (22.4%), and other
private sources (11.9%) (O’Shaughnessy 2014). Since this characteristic of government
funding applies equally to all homes regardless of ownership (Amirkhanyan, Kim and
Lambright 2008, Appendix A), nursing homes are an interesting context to explore how
managers shape networking in response to performance information in less competitive
markets. Using this context, this study may contribute to generalize the theory that perfor-
mance information shapes managerial networking, not only in competitive markets (Cyert
and March 1963), but also in uncompetitive markets.
In the subsequent section, I review the literature on the relationship between perfor-
mance information and managerial networking, and propose theoretical propositions that
introduce performance information as a key determinant of networking. I then present
empirical analysis and key findings, and discuss the theoretical and practical contributions
of this research.
3.2 The Determinants of Managerial Networking: Revisiting Moore’s Theory
Networks refer to “structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or
parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others in some
1For example, in 2012, United States 60% of public health services are delivered by non-profit hospitals
and over 65% of long-term care services are provided by for-profit nursing homes. As governments are more
likely to buy public services rather than to make them, collaboration among public, non-profit and for-profit
organizations in the same industry has received more attention.
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larger hierarchical arrangement” (O’Toole 1997, p.45). As this definition emphasizes, a
network is a structural interdependence among organizations, not individuals, for coordi-
nating joint activities as part of managerial decisions (Agranoff 2007). Though managing
a network is not as easy as handling two- or three-party relationships, due to the com-
plexity and absence of clear authority, managers are willing to be involved in mandated
networks (e.g. political or regulatory links) or voluntary networks (e.g. other competing
organizations or clientele links) in order to obtain significant advantages, such as expertise,
resources and information that can lead to better outcomes (O’Toole and Meier 2011; Tur-
rini et al. 2010). Due to the challenges and environmental uncertainty in public services,
multi-organizational networked arrangements are encouraged in policy implementation.
Although managerial networking has been emerging as a core component of man-
agement linked to performance and has received substantial study (O’Toole 2015), what
drives managers to contact a particular actor needs further study. In the context of con-
tingency theory, environmental uncertainty or innovative strategies motivate managers
to look for additional information outside of their organizations (Andrews et al. 2011;
Boschken 1988). Other studies also provide empirical evidence that decentralized, infor-
mal and specialized organizations are more likely to contact external actors to seek oppor-
tunities or buffer risks (Andrews et al. 2011; Burt 2004). These studies, however, limit
networking nodes to external actors (e.g. third-party actors) and do not include internal
actors, such as clients, staff within organizations. The topic of measuring managerial net-
working as a frequency of interacting with all networking nodes, therefore, is still under-
studied in regards to what determines contact with individual networking nodes and why
managers choose those particular networking nodes over other ones.2 In his book, Creat-
2For instance, Andrews et al. (2011) provide theoretical and empirical evidence that organizational and
environmental characteristics in Texas school districts encourage superintendents to contact external actors
more, but the aggregated measure of external actors does not gives evidence on how and why managers
choose a certain type of external actors over other options.
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ing Public Value, Moore (1995) conceptualizes managerial networking in public services
in a tripartite way that managers manage upward, downward, and outward to network-
ing nodes when considering their stakeholders who significantly influence production of
public value. This parsimonious expression for a complex set of managerial networking
implies that managerial networking works in three different directions with various fre-
quencies to achieve goal attainment. Managing upward indicates a way of networking
with political principals such as upper-level governmental agencies. Managing downward
reflects a way of networking with employees and clientele as a core component of in-
ternal management. Managing outward refers to networking with external actors outside
of their organizations such as civic groups, vendors, and other competing organizations.
O’Toole, Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2005) developed these concepts as testable propo-
sitions to reveal whether the tripartite ways of networking influence organizational per-
formance. They conceptualized that upward and downward networking reflects internal
networking within an organization as a primary interaction with subordinates, clientele,
and political principals, whereas outward networking shows external networking exists
outside of an organization as a voluntary interaction with external actors, not including
principals or hierarchical oriented links. They provide empirical evidence that manag-
ing outward network nodes positively influences most performance dimensions, whereas
managing upward and downward shows a mixed influence on performance, managing up-
ward network nodes never positively influences performance, and managing downward
negatively relates with some performance dimensions. These findings raise the questions
on why managers network in different ways and why does networking have different im-
pacts on the networking-performance linkage. One possible explanation for such different
impacts of networking is that managers in low-performing organizations are forced to in-
teract with upward nodes because political principals are demanding that the organization
increase its level of performance (O’Toole, Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2005, p. 60),
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however, this reversed causal relationship has received little empirical study. Under what
circumstances do managers interact with upward or downward nodes over outward ones?
If performance information affects managerial networking, which performance dimension
is important to generate significant information that influences networking? Since public
service organizations have various performance goals- effectiveness, equity and efficiency
(Conrad et al. 2003; Juenke 2005; O’Toole and Meier 2004a,b), it is worthwhile to unpack
how managers contact upward, downward, and outward networking nodes in response to
performance information.
3.3 Performance Information and Managerial Networking
Cyert and March (1963) emphasize a feedback loop in an organizational decision-
making process. In the cyclical process, managers are likely to evaluate their goal attain-
ment, and then decide who they should contact more frequently in response to performance
information. Their theory indicates that managerial networking is not only determined by
personnel or organizational characteristics, but also generated through the performance
feedback process.
Once managers receive performance information, they evaluate whether the perfor-
mance is satisfactory or not relative to reference points. Without those reference points,
managers cannot evaluate whether their current performance is good enough or bad enough
to change their managerial actions, including the level of contact with various networking
nodes. The Reference Dependence Theory assumes a bounded rationality process whereby
organizations evaluate their performance by comparing the gain or loss in performance
relative to past performance or performance of other competitors (Greve 1998; Levinthal
and March 1981; Tversky and Kahneman 1991; McDermott, Fowler and Smirnov 2008).
Based on the gap between current performance and past performance, historical aspiration,
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or the gap between their performance and other competing organizations’ performance,
social aspiration, managers are likely to decide who they have to contact more frequently
in terms of upward, downward and outward networking nodes. Meier, Favero and Zhu
(2015) develop this notion using a Bayesian logic that prior expectations can be separately
generated by past year performance, the trend in past performance, or performance of
other competitors. All these aspects of performance information can be incorporated into
a complex model of prior expectations. Olsen (2013) hypothesizes that historical and so-
cial aspirations offer asymmetrical sources of comparison: historical aspirations provide
a source of cumulative performance of the current organization, whereas social aspiration
allows managers to evaluate the performance simultaneously achieved by other competing
organizations. In addition, contrary to historical aspirations, he proposes that managers
may be more sensitive to social aspirations than historical aspirations since social aspira-
tions can be a proxy of absolute information without confounding effects of exogenous
disturbances over time. Other scholars, however, contend that public service organizations
cannot foresee future policy outcomes due to the complex environments and goal ambigu-
ity so that they must make managerial decisions based on retrospective information, that
is, historical aspirations (Meier, Favero and Zhu 2015; Lee, Rainey and Chun 2009). Such
conflicting propositions illustrate the need for empirical research to determine whether
historical or social aspirations have the greater influence on managerial networking. Fol-
lowing those studies, I conceptualize performance information as either a gain or a loss
relative to 1) historical aspirations of the past year (a short-term), 2) historical aspirations
linked to the trend in past two years (a long-term) and 3) social aspirations linked to the
average performance of other competitors to explore which aspiration is more influential
for managerial networking.
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Hypothesis 1 Performance information will influence managerial networking, and in that
relationship, social aspirations are more influential in changing managerial network-
ing than historical aspirations are.
3.4 Looking For Different Incentives?
Performance Information from Different Dimensions
Then, how does performance information influence managerial networking? Perfor-
mance information can be separated into two types of information - positive and negative
- depending on whether the current performance is higher than the aspiration level. When
organizations outperform past performance or other competitors, managers perceive this
feedback as positive information, otherwise the information is perceived as negative infor-
mation. Existing literature emphasizes that managers react differently to positive versus
negative information (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Meier, Favero and Zhu 2015; Greve
2007), but it is understudied howmanagers choose networking actors in response to perfor-
mance information. One group of scholars contends that since public service organizations
are risk-averse, managers are more likely to change their managerial practices in response
to failure than in response to success (Cameron and Zammuto 1983; Greve 2007). Due to
political attention and performance pressure, negative information may be more likely to
push managers to find some help from inside and outside of their organizations, which re-
sults in increasing networking in upward, downward, and outward networking nodes (Zhu
and Johansen 2013). Other literature, however, contends that it is unrealistic to assume that
high-performing organizations (those that are exceeding aspirations) do nothing or are less
likely to contact external actors (Rainey 2009). Meier, Favero and Zhu (2015) contends
that, similar to gambling with house money, successful organizations are more likely to
invest their positive gains or slack-resources to expand market shares or take on other
initiatives. The private sector literature also supports this notion that high-performing or-
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ganizations are more likely to look for new market niches, which may lead to greater
networking with external actors (Teece 2009).
In this study, I theorize that the impact of performance information on managerial net-
working differs depending on which performance dimensions are used to measure perfor-
mance information. Existing theoretical and empirical evidence on networking effective-
ness indicates that the impact of networking significantly differs across performance di-
mensions – goal attainment (O’Toole and Meier 2003), equity (O’Toole and Meier 2004a),
community level effectiveness (Fawcett et al. 2000; Conrad et al. 2003), and client level
effectiveness (Provan and Milward 1995; Turrini et al. 2010). Thus, there needs to be
further examination whether different performance dimensions also produce asymmetric
incentives or constraints in contacting other actors whether upward, downward, or out-
ward.
Public service organizations have less competitive markets compared to other private
firms who do not deliver public services due to a high dependence on public funding and
less clear goals (Meier and O’toole 2001; Rainey 2009). For instance, as a long-term care
industry, nursing homes are widely spread out in the United States across sectors, pub-
lic, non-profit and for-profit, but their clientele and funding sources are relatively similar
(Amirkhanyan, Kim and Lambright 2008, Appendix A.3). Moreover, most public ser-
vice organizations have to serve two different principals – state regulatory agencies and
clientele, who monitor the process of public service delivery, so they have to meet the
regulatory requirements imposed by the state and the demands of the clientele at the same
time, generating a complex performance evaluation process and ambiguous goals (Chun
and Rainey 2005).
In public policy areas with more than one performance criterion, I theorize that perfor-
mance criteria produce different incentives or constraints in contacting networking nodes.
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Managers may be more concerned about performance goals that are emphasized by their
primary principals. As noted in Table 3.1, regulatory agencies require public service orga-
nizations to meet the minimum standards of performance in order to protect the public.
Table 3.1: The Impact of Performance Information (PI) on Networking across Different
Performance Dimensions
Positive PI Negative PI
rule compliance Dimension
None
(Less Incentives)
Internal Networking (+)
(Upward & Downward)
Market-value Performance Dimension
External Networking (+)
(Outward)
None
(Less Incentives)
In the context of nursing homes, regulatory agencies set rules and guidelines for long-term
care service quality, and then evaluate those organizations based on their rule compliance.
These rules and guidelines aim to deter inappropriate or dangerous behavior by punishing
poorly performing organizations that fail to meet the minimum requirements. For instance,
in the context of a long-term care industry, U.S. nursing homes are annually monitored by
CMS based on whether they have any deficiencies in their facilities (Amirkhanyan, Kim
and Lambright 2008; Harrington et al. 2000). When a nursing home has a relatively large
number of deficiencies, state Medicare and Medicaid agencies revisit the nursing home
until the substantial corrections for the deficiencies are made. If the nursing home fails to
correct the deficiencies by the time of the first revisit, any repeat revisits are counted as
low-performance by the regulatory agency. Rule compliance indicators generally focus on
ensuring low-end performance, such that low-performance on these indicators are likely
to bring a great deal of political attention that generate greater performance pressures.
Because the deficiency standards are relatively low, exceptional performance is seen as a
matter of course and is not likely to engender much concern. Meier and O’Toole (2011)
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also indicate that since managers perceive low-end performance differently, in their case
such indicators as drop-out rate or enrollment rates as compared to high-end performance,
such that different incentives and constraints derived from those dimensions bring asym-
metrical managerial practices. Low-performing organizations within the rule compliance
dimension are more likely to contact upward networking nodes to reassure them that they
have corrected any deficiency. Likewise, low-performing organizations need to increase
downward networking nodes, as well to find out what generated the deficiencies and how
to eliminate them. Managers in those organizations may be more likely to contact staff
and clientele within their organizations to find out ways to address the problems. On
the contrary, these managers may be unlikely to increase outward networking since their
greatest need is to respond to the regulatory pressure by fixing the problems within their
organizations.
Contrary to the regulatory dimension, the market-value performance indicator focuses
on future clientele and creates additional incentives to increase external networking. Public
service organizations are not only concerned about the evaluation of regulatory agencies,
they are additionally concerned with clientele evaluations to attract future customers. Pub-
lic service organizations are willing to increase market-value performance as a way of ad-
vertising their organizations as among higher quality organizations (Perry and Wise 1990;
Rainey 1982; Wittmer 1991; Brewer and Selden 2000). Using slack-resources and greater
managerial discretion, managers in high-performing organizations within the market-value
performance dimension should be willing to put their time and energy to look for opportu-
nities outside of their organizations, and give more discretion to their competent mid-level
and street-level employees, resulting in increasing outward networking. Managers in low-
performing organizations, however, have less incentives to increase any networking efforts
because in the imperfectly competitive public service delivery industries low-performance
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on such dimension is not directly linked to profits. Most of public service delivery orga-
nizations’ revenue comes primarily from public funding. In nursing homes, for example,
most of revenue comes from Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement. Additionally, nurs-
ing homes have a relatively stable amount of customers because clientele rarely move
from one nursing home to another, unless there is a dramatic quality drop. Such stable
clientele makes managers sluggish to responding to low-performance within the market-
value dimensions in regards to networking. Due to the high dependence on public funding
and the lower salience of service quality that limits incentives to change networking, low-
performing organizations will generally choose not to increase networking until political
principals force them to do so. I, therefore, hypothesize that different incentives for differ-
ent performance dimensions leverage the impacts of performance information on manage-
rial networking in different ways: negative performance information in a rule compliance
indicator will increase inward and downward networking, whereas positive performance
information in a market-value performance indicator will increase outward networking.
Hypothesis 2 Due to the increased likelihood of punishment, negative performance infor-
mation in a rule compliance indicator will be more likely to increase upward and
downward networking.
Hypothesis 3 Due to the high incentives of rewards, positive performance information in
a market-value indicator will be more likely to increase outward networking.
3.5 Research Design
3.5.1 Data and Method
To test the hypotheses, I analyzed 714 U.S. nursing homes including 259 public, 254
non-profit, and 201 for-profit nursing homes. U.S. nursing homes provide a good empirical
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context for exploring the impact of performance information on networking. Performance
of nursing homes has received more attention by policy makers and constituents recently,
due to increased public spending and the salience of health care generally. During 2013,
U.S. nursing homes had about 1.4 million residents and 1.7 million licensed beds, and
about 75% of those residents used government funds from Medicare and Medicaid (CDC
2013). As the percentage of elderly, those over the age of 60, has increased and is estimated
to be 26% of U.S. population by the year 2050 (Kinsella and Velkoff 2001), the concerns
about nursing home quality has also increased, and led managers to adopt performance-
based management systems. In addition, nursing homes have existing rule compliance and
market-value performance indicators that are equally applied to all homes. All these char-
acteristics help to explore how performance information affects managerial networking on
different performance dimensions.
This study used the 2013 Nursing Home Administrative Survey, 2010-2013 Nursing
Home Compare (NHC) data, and 2010 Census data. The Nursing Home Administrative
Survey data, collected by Project of Equity, Representation, and Governance (PERG), pro-
vided information on managerial practices and perceptions of nursing home administrators
including networking behaviors, strategies and goal priorities. Since the number of U.S.
nursing homes is unbalanced across sectors, 69% are for-profit homes, 25% non-profit
homes, and 6% public homes in 2013. The researchers selected a stratified random sample
from each sector to make a representative sample. They generated a random sample of
2,900 nursing homes: 1,000 for-profit and 1,000 non-profit, and the full population of 903
public nursing homes and conducted a three-wave survey from January of 2013 to May of
2013 through both online and mail. A total of 725 nursing home administrators responded,
a 24.9% response rate, but for this study, I analyzed only 714 homes because of missing
data on managerial networking.
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Nursing Home Compare data also provides general information on organizational char-
acteristics of nursing homes such as the number of certified beds, the number of staff,
nurses, occupancy rates, chain affiliations, percentage of residents who have special needs,
and ownership status. The data also provide information on nursing home performance
indicators, the number of health deficiencies derived from both health and complaint in-
spections and the 5-star overall quality rating score, reported by the Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services (CMS). The number of deficiencies is a good performance indicator
to gauge whether a nursing home is complying with the rules and regulations imposed
by state regulatory agencies. All nursing homes participating in Medicare and Medicaid
programs should receive an annual inspection in terms of deficiencies; trained state survey
teams assess each nursing home on the basis of their compliance with federal requirements.
There are approximately 180 regulatory requirements in terms of health deficiency catego-
rizes 1) medication management, 2) proper skin care, 3) assessment of resident needs, 4)
nursing home administration, 5) environment, 6) kitchen/food services, 7) resident rights
and 8) quality of care (CMS 2012). State inspectors investigate health and complaint sta-
tuses in each nursing home annually on average and count the number of deficiencies.
Based on the most recent three years inspection surveys, state inspectors decide whether
any repeat revisits are needed to correct those deficiencies, so most revisits indicate that a
nursing home has serious quality problems.
The five-star overall quality rating is also a good indicator for current and future resi-
dents’ performance perspectives because the rating quality helps residents to evaluate each
home’s quality intuitively in terms of health inspection, quality outcomes, and diversity of
staff (RN/LPN/nurse aide). CMS reports the five-star overall quality rating for each home
on their ’nursing home compare’ website: the top 10 percent homes in each State earn
a five-star rating, the middle 70 percent earn a rating of two, three or four stars, approx-
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imately 23.3 percent in each rating category, and the bottom 20 percent earn a one-star
rating. The indicator helps clientele to easily compare nursing homes within their county,
so the performance information generated from this indicator would serve as a way to
attract future residents to the nursing home. I also used 2010 Census data at the county
level to provide information on the elderly population, poverty rates, and urbanized rate
for resident characteristics and other environmental factors.
For the data analysis, I specified the general networking model using an Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) specification with the consideration of cross-unit heterogeneity. Since a
general networking variable measured as a first factor is derived from factor analysis of all
networking nodes, the continuous networking variable fits the OLS assumptions. Specifi-
cally, for testing the impact of performance information on each networking node, I used
the Ordered Probit model specification for the analysis of each ordinal networking node.
3.5.2 Dependent Variable: Managerial Networking
I measured managerial networking as a frequency of contacting other actors on a 6-
point scale, from never to daily. O’Toole, Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2005) use this
measure on the assumption that managers cannot engage in networking without coming
into contact with other actors. The Nursing Home Administrative Survey provides re-
sponses to the question of “As a Nursing Home Administrator, how frequently do you
interact with the following organizations and persons?” for a range of network nodes from
nursing home corporate offices to information/assistive technology vendors. Table 3.2 in-
dicates that all items load positively on the first factor loads positively which taps a general
propensity to engage in managerial networking.
I treated each networking node separately to explore whether performance information
motivates managers to contact each actor differently. Networking with each actor is mea-
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Table 3.2: Factor Loadings of 7 Networking Nodes Items Using U.S. Nursing Home Ad-
ministrator Surveys
Items Mean Std. Dev. Factor 1
Your nursing home’s corporate office 3.776 1.18 0.4513
Other nursing home staff 4.803 0.61 0.2126
Nursing home residents or resident-groups 4.679 0.74 0.2996
State regulatory agencies 1.365 0.59 0.4294
State Medicaid 1.52 1.06 0.6488
Insurance companies 1.519 1.07 0.6454
Information assistive technology vendors 1.745 1.22 0.7168
Eigenvalue 1.8741
sured on a six-point scale from 0 to 5 by ‘never‘, ‘yearly‘, ‘monthly‘, ‘weekly‘, ‘more than
once a week‘, and ‘daily‘, I used this ordinal variable for each networking node to see the
direction and the frequency of networking with each actor. I categorized each networking
node to how it represents the direction of networking among upward, downward and out-
ward according to Moore (1995). I treated ‘residents‘ and ‘staff‘ as downward networking
nodes, ‘corporate office‘, ‘state regulatory agencies‘ and ‘state Medicaid‘ as upward net-
working nodes and ‘insurance companies‘ and ’informative/assistive technology vendors’
as outward networking nodes. As noted in Appendix B, managers in nursing homes con-
tact downward/internal networking nodes, such as staffs and residents, more frequently
than other upward or outward networking nodes on average. However, the frequency of
networking for each actor varies across homes, which provides variation to examine the
impact of performance as a determinant of managerial networking.
3.5.3 Independent Variable: Performance Information
To measure a key independent variable, performance information, I created both his-
torical aspirations and social aspirations using the number of deficiencies and the overall
5 star-rating performance indicators. I measured historical aspiration as 1) a performance
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gap between performance in 2012 (t-1) and performance in 2011(t-2) within a nursing
home, and 2) a performance gap between performance in 2011 (t-2) and performance in
2010 (t-3) within a nursing home. Those two historical aspirations variables provide both
performance information relative to the past year, a short-term effect, and performance
information on a trend for the past two years, a long-term effect. Since managerial net-
working nodes are measured in 2013 (t), it is assumed that top managers in nursing homes
perceived historical performance information in both a short-term and a long-term frame,
and tried to apply that information when deciding who to contact more in the up-coming
year. Though it is difficult to test the causal effect of performance information on manage-
rial networking using one-time cross-sectional survey data, such historical performance
gaps help to set performance information as antecedents to managerial networking.
Social aspirations are measured as a performance gap between a nursing home and
the average nursing homes within the county. The average of all competitors within a
competitive market area has been seen as a threshold point for deciding when managers
make decisions (Greve 2007). If an organization performs poorly relative to the average of
other competitors, it should be a signal to change managerial networking and to seek help
to improve performance in order to survive in the market. Potential residents for nursing
homes are likely to choose a nursing home within their own county, this means that a
county-level social aspiration measure can be a good indicator for whether each nursing
home outperforms competitors, on average (Amirkhanyan, Kim and Lambright 2008).
The latest social aspirations gap is likely to have a significant impact on decision-making
in management practices (Olsen 2013); I used 2012 performance data in all nursing homes
to measure social aspirations.
I created the performance information measures using two different performance di-
mensions, rule compliance and market-value dimensions. The number of deficiencies
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represents a rule compliance indicator because it is derived from annual state regulatory
evaluations on health quality and compliant surveys. 3 Moreover, the total sum of deficien-
cies has been commonly used as a standard performance indicator in the field of nursing
homes (Harrington et al. 2000; Amirkhanyan, Kim and Lambright 2008). Since a higher
number of deficiencies indicates that a nursing home has more regulatory violations and
lower performance, I reversed the direction of deficiencies to create a performance indica-
tor consistent with the other performance indicators. The historical aspiration measure in
2012-2011 ranges from -29 to 35, with a mean of 0.24 and a standard deviation of 5.60,
whereas the social aspiration measure ranges from -24.2 to 9.67 with a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 4.59.
The five-star overall quality rating score reflects market-value quality performance.
All nursing homes participating in Medicare or Medicaid are subject to evaluation by the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) in terms of health inspection, staffing
and quality measures; then the total quality score is transferred to the five-star point scale
to provide for a simple and comprehensible measure for potential and current residents.
In contrast to the number of deficiencies, the five-star rating score aims to provide a more
visible and intuitive performance indicator for consumers, so anyone who is interested in
looking for a good quality home can easily access the score through the ‘Nursing Home
Compare‘ website, and make a decision by comparing to other competitors based on this
score. Thus, for nursing homes to succeed in recruiting future residents, they need to
be concerned about the five-star rating performance and put their efforts into increasing
this score. I used the five-star overall quality rating score for health inspections, staffing
and Quality Measures and created a set of historical aspirations and social aspirations.
3The CMS report indicates that state inspections are conducted annually on average; nursing homes rarely
have more than 15 months gap between surveys. Since it brings some technical problems to create consistent
performance measures across homes in each year, this research measures performance information based on
the performance gaps between surveys in each nursing homes.
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Historical aspirations on the 5-star rating are measured as a short-term effect, January
2013-January 2012, and a long-term effect, January 2012- January 2011. Social aspiration
is calculated based on January 2013 reports on performance gaps between a single nursing
home and the average nursing homes on the county-level. As noted in Appendix B, the
descriptive analysis on performance information on the five-star ratings indicates that the
five star-ratings vary across year and across homes within a county.
3.5.4 Control Variables
Existing studies on the determinants of managerial networking indicate that organiza-
tional characteristics and administrative capacity may influence managerial networking.
I controlled for organizational characteristics of nursing homes, the size, occupancy rate,
task difficulty, capacity (nurses per residents), hospital-affiliation, chain-affiliation, market
competition, managerial strategy (prospecting and defending) and ownership. These orga-
nizational characteristics are related to the potential resources and managerial capacity that
may affect both performance and managerial networking. I included tenure as a control
variable to exclude any effect of organizational learning from their job experience within
a specific home. I also controlled for environmental factors such as urbanization and the
elderly population using Census data at the county-leveled in order to minimize the influ-
ence of environmental challenges on managerial networking. The specific measurements
and data sources are described in table 3.3.
3.6 Empirical Findings
For testing the hypothesis 1, I analyzed three models to explore the impact of perfor-
mance information derived from each aspiration level on general managerial networking.
Table 3.4 shows that, in terms of the rule compliance, social aspirations significantly in-
fluences how managers contact other networking nodes whereas both short-term and long-
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Table 3.3: The Summary of Control Variable Measurement
Variable Operational Definition/Measurement Sources
Organizational Size Total number of beds NHC 2013
Task difficulty
The sum of squared of the number of residents
dependent on staffs in terms of transferring, toi-
let, eating, continence, mobility, skin integrity,
mental status and loosing weight (Herfindal in-
dex)
NHC 2013
Occupancy
The total number of residents divided by the to-
tal beds
NHC 2013
Managerial capacity
The number of nurses (registered and voca-
tional nurses) per a resident
NHC 2013
Hospital affiliated
Networked with hospital; Dummy variable (1=
yes, 0=no)
NHC 2013
Chain affiliated
Chain-affiliated nursing homes; Dummy vari-
able (1= yes, 0=no)
NHC 2013
Market competition
The sum of squared market shares for all facili-
ties in the county (Herfindal index)
NHC 2013
Strategy
Managerial Strategy measured as a prospector
and a defender using the first factor of factor
analysis of responses on questions of their ten-
dency of exploiting opportunity or focusing on
efficiency given environmental uncertainty.
PERG Executive
Survey 2013
Ownership
Dummy Variable: Public=1, Non-profit=2, and
For-profit=3
NHC 2013
Tenure
Average tenure of a chief manager in a current
nursing home
PERG Executive
Survey 2013
Elderly
Proportion of population in elderly (65 years or
order) in the county
Census 2010
Urban
The percentage of residents who live in urban
areas in the county
Census 2010
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Table 3.4: The Impact of Performance Information on General Managerial Networking:
Rule Compliance
DV: General Managerial Networking Model1 Model2 Model3
b/se b/se b/se
Short-term Historical Aspiration: rule compliance PI -0.007
(0.01)
Long-term Historical Aspiration: rule compliance PI -0.007
(0.01)
Social Aspiration: rule compliance PI -0.027*
(0.01)
Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Occupancy -0.512 -0.557 -0.437
(0.45) (0.44) (0.44)
Task Difficulty 0.572 0.640 0.500
(0.64) (0.64) (0.63)
Capacity -0.218 -0.220 -0.099
(0.35) (0.35) (0.36)
In hospital -0.144 -0.161 -0.198
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
In chain -0.146 -0.128 -0.159
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Urban -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Elderly -0.041* -0.041* -0.039*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Market Competition 0.537 0.525 0.571
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Tenure 0.022** 0.022** 0.022*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Prospector 0.122* 0.121* 0.125*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Defender 0.100 0.103 0.109
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Public -0.541*** -0.520** -0.523**
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Non-profit -0.413** -0.403** -0.374**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
(constant) 1.194* 1.219* 1.074
(0.59) (0.59) (0.59)
R-square 0.167 0.169 0.178
N 299 298 299
Note: Higher value in performance information means higher level of rule compliance.
For-profit nursing homes are base-line.
The number of sample is reduced because of missing observations in networking nodes
Two-tailed tests of significance * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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term historical aspiration do not have significant impacts on networking. The findings
indicate that managers are less likely to contact other actors when they outperform other
competitors on average. These results support the hypothesis 1 that managers are more
concerned about social aspiration than historical aspiration, and as long as their perfor-
mance is higher than the average of others in the rule compliance dimension, they are less
likely to seek other help or information inside or outside of their organizations. The find-
ings show that managers perceive rule compliance as a low-end performance dimension
that essentially generates more pressure and political attention for low-performing orga-
nizations. Nursing homes performing worse than others, therefore, need to explain their
results to upper-level monitoring organizations more frequently, to put more controls on
work process in their internal management, and to seek help and resources from external
actors.
As noted in table 3.5, social aspiration is consistently more significant than histori-
cal aspiration in market-value performance indicators. The findings support hypothesis 1
that regardless of performance dimensions, nursing home managers are more concerned
about how much they outperform others, rather than how well they perform as compared
to previous years when deciding managerial networking. Interestingly, market-value per-
formance information shows a different direction: social aspiration positively influences
managerial networking. This positive influence indicates that the effect of performance
information differs across performance dimensions. In terms of the market-value per-
formance information, managers in a higher-performing organization are more likely to
exploit opportunities through expanded networking because of slack-resources and a good
reputation as a competitive organization. However, this general networking analysis does
not provide information whether managers in high-performance organizations are more
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Table 3.5: The Impact of Performance Information on General Managerial Networking:
Market-value Performance Indicator
DV:Networking nodes Model1 Model2 Model3
b/se b/se b/se
Short-term Historical Aspiration: Market-value PI -0.037
(0.06)
Long-term Historical Aspiration: market-value PI -0.057
(0.06)
Social Aspiration: Market-value PI 0.207*
(0.10)
Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Occupancy -0.552 -0.563 -0.612
(0.44) (0.44) (0.44)
Task Difficulty 0.549 0.538 0.711
(0.64) (0.64) (0.63)
Capacity -0.225 -0.242 -0.281
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
In hospital -0.147 -0.138 -0.126
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
In chain -0.137 -0.139 -0.137
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Urban -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Elderly -0.040* -0.042* -0.042*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Market Competition 0.532 0.561 0.510
(0.31) (0.31) (0.30)
Tenure 0.023** 0.022* 0.024**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Prospector 0.124* 0.123* 0.099
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Defender 0.104 0.098 0.095
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Public -0.525** -0.537*** -0.540***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Non-profit -0.407** -0.396** -0.420**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
(constant) 1.203* 1.225* 1.279*
(0.59) (0.59) (0.59)
R-square 0.166 0.168 0.179
N 299 299 299
For-profit nursing homes are base-line.
The number of sample is reduced because of missing observations in networking nodes
Two-tailed tests of significance * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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focused on outward networking than downward or upward networking, so further analysis
of the impact of performance information on individual networking nodes is needed.
Table 3.6: The Impact of Performance Information of Rule Compliance on Individual
Networking Nodes: Standardized Coefficients
Resident Staff Corporate Regulate Medicaid Insurance Vendors
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Short-term historical aspiration 0.072 -0.034 -0.014 0.004 -0.016* -0.009 -0.011
(0.10) (0.57) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Pseudo R-square 0.037 0.043 0.034 0.019 0.030 0.024 0.018
N 713 712 374 711 678 668 636
Long-term historical aspiration -0.016* 0.039 -0.002 -0.008 -0.004 0.011 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Pseudo R-square 0.037 0.041 0.032 0.019 0.028 0.023 0.016
N 706 705 370 705 672 662 632
Social aspiration -0.024 -0.017 -0.031* -0.013 -0.019* -0.007 -0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Pseudo R-square 0.036 0.004 0.037 0.020 0.030 0.023 0.017
N 713 712 374 711 678 668 636
Note: 1. All equations control for size, occupancy, task difficulty, tenure, managerial strategy (prospecting and defending)
market competition, hospital affiliation, chain affiliation, operating groups, urban areas, elderly and ownership.
2. High-value in rule compliance information means high-levels of rule compliance in the regulatory indicator.
3. Two-tailed tests of significance + p<0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01
Table 3.6 shows the impact of performance information on individual networking
nodes for rule compliance. Although individual networking nodes show different relation-
ships with aspirations, all significant coefficients indicate that performance information
for the rule compliance indicator are negatively associated with downward and upward
networking nodes. Managers who outperform past performance are less likely to con-
tact regulatory agencies, i.e. Medicaid, or residents, and managers who outperform other
competitors are also less likely to expand their networking with their corporate offices
and Medicaid. However, performance information in regard to rule compliance does not
have a significant relationship with outward networking nodes. This supports my second
hypothesis that rule compliance information induces managers to seek problem solutions
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from inside of their organizations and seek help from upper-level monitoring agencies in
the expectation of punishment.
How is the impact different in the market-value indicator? Table 3.7 shows supporting
evidence for the third hypothesis that high-performing organizations on the market-value
indicator are more likely to contact insurance companies or information/assistive technol-
ogy vendors, which is consistent with the incentive to recruit future clientele. Positive
performance information in previous years also increases networking with upward net-
working nodes (Medicaid) in response to the market-value indicator. Since Medicaid is
a major source of funds as well as a regulatory agency, managers in a high-performing
nursing home may respond to an increased demand of services. Another interesting find-
ing is that low-performing organizations relative to the past year are more likely to contact
corporate offices, but that impact is not consistent with other contacts with residents or
staff. In all likelihood this relationship reflects the need to justify to the corporate office
the decline in quality scores even though there is no effort to do so for the clientele or the
staff. Though Table 3.7 shows mixed findings in terms of downward and upward network-
ing, the imperfect market context of U.S. nursing homes may provide an explanation for
why managers are only concerned about networking with corporate offices and Medicaid.
3.7 Conclusion
This research revisits Moore (1995)’s management typology to examine the impact of
performance information on managerial networking nodes. By expanding the scope of
existing literature on managerial networking, I contend that the impact of performance
information differs depending on the specific performance dimensions (regulatory versus
market-value indicators), aspirations (historical versus social aspirations) and individual
networking nodes (downward, upward, and outward). The findings provide some support
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Table 3.7: The Impact of Performance Information of Market-value Indicator on Individ-
ual Networking Nodes: Standardized Coefficients
Resident Staff Corporate Regulate Medicaid Insurance Vendors
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Short-term historical aspiration 0.005 0.005 -0.137* -0.033 -0.029 0.073+ 0.041
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Pseudo R-square 0.036 0.043 0.037 0.020 0.028 0.025 0.017
N 713 712 374 711 678 668 636
Long-term historical aspiration 0.020 -0.097 0.033 0.082 0.105* -0.059 -0.003
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Pseudo R-square 0.036 0.046 0.032 0.021 0.031 0.024 0.017
N 713 712 374 711 678 668 636
Social aspiration -0.001 -0.076 0.068 -0.016 -0.020 0.020 0.209*
(0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Pseudo R-square 0.036 0.044 0.033 0.019 0.028 0.023 0.020
N 713 712 374 711 678 668 636
Note: 1. All equations control for size, occupancy, task difficulty, tenure, managerial strategy (prospecting and defending)
market competition, hospital affiliation, chain affiliation, operating groups, urban areas, elderly and ownership.
3. Two-tailed tests of significance + p<0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01
for my theory that the impact of performance information on networking differs depending
on performance dimensions because of asymmetrical incentives and punishments. Man-
agers strategically choose who they have to contact depending on specific performance
feedback. Managers are also more concerned with social aspirations rather than historical
aspirations in decisions on general networking, which indicates that managers consider
social aspirations as the best proxy of value when they decide whether the current perfor-
mance is either high or low enough to justify a change in network behavior. This study
makes several theoretical and practical contributions; it revisits the causal relationship be-
tween managerial networking and performance, and explores the reverse causal relation-
ship that performance information derived from historical and social aspirations generates
different incentives to change managerial networking. The findings show that networking,
as an important factor that determines organizational performance (Meier and O’Toole
2011; O’Toole and Meier 2011; Andrews et al. 2011), is not only determined by managers’
personnel characteristics and organizational characteristics, but also affected through the
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performance feedback process. As performance-based management increases in public
service delivery (Moynihan 2008b), how performance information influences managerial
practices is an important question to be tested. This study takes a one step forward to
explore the underlying mechanisms of determining managerial networking through the
performance process. This study also contributes to the literature of public policy that
the context of industries in public services need to be understood first when governments
design performance evaluation systems. Public service organizations have less competi-
tive markets and rely on public funding sources, so they perceive different incentives and
punishments from different performance indicators. The findings reveal that managers
expect punishments from low-performance in regulatory indicators and incentives from
high-performance on market-value indicators; therefore, research needs to consider which
performance dimensions are used when measuring performance information in manager’s
minds. If policy makers aim to increase the quality of a long-term care industry, they need
to carefully examine incentives and punishments for each performance indicator.
60
4. LOOKING FOR STRATEGIES IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: THE IMPACT
OF PERFORMANCE INFORMATION ON MANAGERIAL STRATEGY IN U.S.
PUBLIC, NON-PROFIT, AND FOR-PROFIT NURSING HOMES
4.1 Introduction
The relationship between managerial strategy and performance is an enduring topic in
public administration (Andrews et al. 2008; Boyne and Walker 2004; Olson, Slater and
Hult 2005; Zahra and Pearce 1990). With uncertain environments and limited resources,
managers should make strategic decisions on adopting innovations or focusing on core
tasks with consistent procedures. In their seminal work, Miles and Snow (1978) intro-
duced a fourfold typology of strategy, prospecting, defending, analyzing and reacting, and
emphasized that the fit of strategy coupled with environment, process and structure is a
key for better performance. Though their study was ignored until 1990, recently many
scholars have provided theoretical and empirical evidence of strategies in achieving better
outcomes in public and private organizations (Nutt and Backoff 1995; Meier et al. 2010;
Zahra and Pearce 1990; Ingraham, Joyce and Donahue 2003; Ketchen, Thomas and Mc-
Daniel 1996). Walker (2013) indicates that among 25 empirical studies, over 50 percent
of studies support Miles and Snow’s theory showing that managerial strategy is a key
determinant of organizational performance.
Despite the high volume of studies on managerial strategy and performance, how
managers make a strategic decision in response to performance has less attention in the
public management (Nielsen and Baekgaard 2015). Since organizations have a cyclical
process between performance and management (Ingraham, Joyce and Donahue 2003),
performance information, whether organizations have a satisfactory achievement relative
61
to prior expectations, may make managers engage in result-oriented planning in terms
of goal setting, resource allocation, and personnel management (Rainey 2009; Moynihan
2008a). Managerial strategy is not an exception. Through this feedback loop, managers
analyze gains and losses, and use this information to modify their strategy to find the best
way for enhancing performance (Meier, Favero and Zhu 2015). Performance manage-
ment literature also emphasizes that performance information is frequently communicated
to employees, stakeholders and the public, which may shift the focus of managers from
inputs to the process toward results (Moynihan 2008a). In this perspective, managerial
strategy is not only predetermined by personnel or organizational characteristics, but gen-
erated through performance information. However, there are no prior studies of how and
why performance information shapes managerial strategy.
This research looks to change the causal direction between managerial strategy and
performance in the previous literature. I explore how and why managers adopt a certain
strategy in response to performance information and how the relationship is contingent
on sectors. American nursing homes provide the good empirical context for this research
question. With an increase in public spending and a rapidly growing elderly population,
the quality of long-term care has received attention. Specifically, performance manage-
ment for nursing home managers is now required. In addition, as the standardized quality
index, a five-star rating which helps residents evaluate nursing home quality at a glance,
has increased in use, managers need to change their management strategy in response.
Finally, American nursing homes have three different sectors, public, nonprofit, and for-
profit, which allows us to explore how the use of performance information differs across
sectors when deciding managerial strategy.
This study provides several contributions to public management and healthcare man-
agement. First, I conceptualize how performance information is generated using reference
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dependence theory. Organizational performance is socially constructed and interpreted
(Brewer Selden, 2000; Forbes, Hill Lynn, 2006, p. 255). Even if an organization receives
a performance score that is equitable to other organizations, the score can be interpreted
and constructed differently depending on its prior aspirations. The findings highlight that
managers are more responsive to how much they outperform others rather than whether
they perform better than past years, when deciding managerial strategy.
Second, I explore how the use of performance information on strategy is contingent on
sectors. Ownership determines goal clarity, managerial discretion or incentives that may
influence a manager’s ability to use performance information on strategy selection. Al-
though a manager might want to engage in a certain strategy with perceived performance
information, a lack of clear goals, discretion or incentives constrain their ability to utilize
performance information in managerial strategy. The findings indicate that for-profit man-
agers are the only type of manager that adopt both a prospecting and a defending strategy
in response to positive performance information; whereas public and non-profit managers
do not change strategy regarding of performance information.
Finally, this research contributes to the healthcare management literature that the stan-
dardized quality index, a five-star rating, provides an important signal for managers to
change strategy, however, this is only significant in for-profit organizations. The findings
reveal that a five-star rating is valid and communicated with managers only if the organi-
zation has a higher dependency on clientele, few slack resources, and low service measur-
ability. The findings will provide practical implications to healthcare service organizations
that it is important to develop valid performance measures to ensure the effectiveness of
performance-based management.
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4.2 The Theory of Managerial Strategy
Managerial strategy refers to a way of a manager handle operations and adjusts align-
ments with external environments. In the theory of adoptive cycle, Miles and Snow (1978)
contend that organizations have to deal with three types of problems: entrepreneurial
problems in market-product domains, engineering problems in an organization’s techni-
cal systems, and administrative problems in structures and processes. These problems
force a manager to develop a managerial strategy for adjusting their organizations to better
suit their environments. Miles and Snow suggest four typologies of managerial strate-
gies: prospecting- searching market opportunities or innovations, defending-searching
efficiency by focusing on core products, analyzing- having a blend of prospecting and
defending, and reacting- having no action until forced to adopt a strategy by external pres-
sures.
Based on those four strategies, Mile and Snow demonstrate that the the fit of strategy
coupled with external environment, process, and structure is important to improve per-
formance. After their seminal work, many scholars in public management have explored
dynamic aspects of managerial strategy in both public and private organizations. Empir-
ical studies using English local governments find that prospectors are more likely to be
successful when they have flexible circumstances and a decentralized structure with many
key stakeholders to negotiate with (Andrews et al. 2011; Andrews, Boyne, Law andWalker
2012). Studies using private firms support the empirical evidences that, in the uncertain
environments, prospectors are more likely to be successful in increasing their market-share
by seeking new niche market opportunities (Conant, Mokwa and Varadarajan 1990; Short-
ell and Zajac 1990). Texas school district studies, on the other hand, indicate that defenders
are more successful in centralized and stable organizations by allowing top-managers to
hold a planned and consistent approach to implement strategies (Meier et al. 2007, 2010).
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Following studies emphasize that managers generally pursue multiple strategies to de-
velop their capacities to fit in complex environment (Meier et al. 2010; Walker 2013;
Boyne and Walker 2004). Organizations might be prospectors on some tasks, but be more
defenders on others, so analyzing, a blended strategy between prospecting and defending,
is redundant because all organizations are analyzers at some point. Additionally, a react-
ing strategy is not predictable based on organization characteristics because reactors can
lack strategy altogether and rely on decisions from powerful stakeholders instead (Walker
2013). Miles and Snow’s theoretical arguments also concentrate on prospecting and de-
fending strategies as the most distinctive types, and provide little discussion on the other
two strategies (Meier et al. 2010), thus, I focus on the prospecting and defending strategy.
Though following studies of Miles and Snow (1978) contribute to our understanding
on the strategy-performance link, they also raise an important question that still remains
unanswered. Most studies do not explore whether performance affects strategy. Exist-
ing studies assume that strategy is constant and predetermined by organizational structure,
environment, and process (Ginsberg 1988; Donaldson 2001), and neglect to examine un-
der what conditions strategy can be changed. Even though a few studies include prior-
performance indicators in their models to control for the possibility of reverse-causality
(Andrews, Boyne, Meier, O’Toole and Walker 2012; Walker et al. 2010), they do not pro-
vide enough evidence on how the information influences managerial strategy.
4.3 Managerial Strategy and Performance Information
Managers consider performance information and try to employ the information to man-
agement (Meier, Favero and Zhu 2015). Performance management literature emphasizes
that such utilization of performance information causes managers to adjust goals and tasks
(Hartley and Allison 2002; Moynihan and Ingraham 2004; Askim 2008). In this per-
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spective, managerial strategy is not only predetermined by personnel or organizational
characteristics, but is generated through the performance-feedback process.
In their classic book,‘Behavioral Theory of the Firm’, Cyert and March (1963) focused
on a cyclical process between management and performance, and explore how managers
utilize performance information when deciding managerial actions. Managers analyze
their goal attainment, and try adjust their process based on whether they perform better
than prior expectations. Once managers perceived performance feedback, they evaluate
whether the performance is satisfactory or not based on their aspiration levels. Without
aspiration levels, managers may not be able to decide whether their current performance
is good enough or bad enough to change strategy. Theories of reference dependence and
prospecting theory provide interesting assumptions on aspiration points. Managers eval-
uate their performance by information of gains or loss comparing to past performance
(historical aspiration) or performance of other competitors (social aspiration) (Tversky
and Kahneman 1991; McDermott, Fowler and Smirnov 2008). Meier, Favero and Zhu
(2015) also introduce performance information, using Bayesian theory, that finds the prior
expectations can be separately generated by past year performance or performance of other
competitors, and all aspects of performance information are incorporated into a complex
model of prior expectations. Following those studies, I conceptualize performance infor-
mation (PI) as gains or loss relative to past year historical aspiration, and social aspiration,
the average performance of other competing organizations.
PIhistorical aspiration = Pit Pi(t 1); where t is current year
PIsocial aspiration = Pit Pjt ; where j indicates other competing organizations
66
How do managers utilize performance information when deciding strategy? Perfor-
mance information can be separated into two types, positive and negative, depending on
whether the current performance is better than the aspiration levels. When organizations
outperform past performance, or the average of other competing organizations, managers
perceive that information as positive, otherwise, the information is perceived as negative.
Existing literature emphasized that managers respond differently to positive and negative
performance information (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Greve 2007).
Meier, Favero and Zhu (2015) contend that positive performance information produces
slack resources and more discretion to managers. They illustrate that positive performance
information is the equivalent of gambling with house money. When performance exceeds
prior expectations, managers can invest positive gains in expanding market shares or try-
ing to find out new market opportunity. The strategic planning literature also supports
this notion that managers are more likely to adopt innovation when they have strong fis-
cal resources to invest (Berry 1994), that may come from positive performance informa-
tion. Moreover, positive performance also generates greater managerial autonomy. Rourke
(1969) contend that the good reputation for performance expands managerial autonomy,
thus, managers are able to utilize gains to services by innovating. Carpenter (2001) ) also
provides empirical evidence that the reputation for positive performance over years versus
positive performance for other competing organizations generates trust and support from
upper level authorities, which results in greater managerial discretion. Such a wider au-
tonomy allows managers to think about a long-term plan for investing slack resources in
searching for new opportunities such as, adopting a prospecting strategy
Hypothesis 1 Performance information will be positively associated with prospecting strat-
egy.
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Unlike to positive performance information, negative performance information may
not have a clear linear relationship with strategy. Once unsatisfactory performance, rela-
tive to the historical or social aspiration, is perceived, managers should try to fix problems
within organizations first. It may increase control or oversight for internal management
and core tasks. However, as Meier, Favero and Zhu (2015) propose, relatively modest neg-
ative performance information is likely to lead managers to adopt a defending strategy and
make modest incremental changes in their strategy. Unless the poor performance results
in receiving significant attention from stakeholders or upper level authorities, managers
may focus on operating efficiency and core values. Managers may think that optimizing
procedures and buffering the environment can help to compensate for modestly poor per-
formance. In this sense, a defending strategy may be mostly adopted when organizations
have an acceptable range of negative performance information. Other studies indicate that
managers with modestly poor performance may try to limit influences of external environ-
ment so that employees can concentrate on internal efficiency and core tasks (Meier and
O’Toole 2008; Walker 2013). However, once the negative information is large enough to
attract attention from stakeholders and upper-level agencies, managers may need to make
major changes in procedures and structures according to the instructions of regulatory
agencies, which may decrease defending strategies. Poor performing nursing homes in the
United States, for example, are under the control of state Medicare agencies. When a nurs-
ing home performs poorly in consecutive years, state Medicare staff will visit the facility
to check whether there have been any improvements in response to the agency?s instruc-
tions. The number of revisits is included as one of the performance measure that could
lead to shutting down the nursing home or reducing its reimbursement rate of Medicare
and Medicaid.
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Hypothesis 2 Performance information will have a inverted U-shape relationship with
defending strategy.
4.4 Finding Strategies in All the Wrong Places? The Impact of Sector-differences
As the demand for public services increases, nonprofit and for-profit organizations
are gradually increasing in the number of public services they deliver. To ensure better
quality services, performance-based management becomes a general way to evaluate goal
attainment that is applied to all public, nonprofit and for-profit organizations. Based on
standardized quality index, managers can perceive performance information on a regular
basis and employ the information in managerial practices (Ferlie 1996; Pollitt 2003). As
it becomes easier to compare the quality of services across sectors, public organizations
are more likely to use business sector management tools, based on this concept that there
is no difference across sectors (Murray 1975). However, there is no empirical evidence on
how the use of performance information on strategies differ across sectors.
Ownership generates different goal clarity, managerial autonomy, and economic in-
centive across sectors (Rainey 2009; Rainey and Bozeman 2000; Hvidman and Andersen
2014). The differences may generate a different degree of motivation to use performance
information on managerial strategy. Public organizations have less invisible, unquantifi-
able, and hard to measure performance goals, such as equity, openness, and responsive-
ness, when compared to private organizations. This goal ambiguity influences public or-
ganizations to be reluctant to change their strategy, even if it is needed. Public organiza-
tions may make incremental changes based on past performance, rather than performance
of other organizations. The nonprofit sector has relatively ambiguous performance goals
compared to for-profit organization. Forbes (1998) contends that nonprofit organizations
lack simple performance goals, such as profitability, that for-profit organizations have.
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Additionally, Herzlinger (1995) argues that the complex non-financial performance goals
in nonprofit organizations hinder measurements of effectiveness. For-profit organizations,
on the other hand, have relatively clear goals in delivering public services, such as prof-
itability and shareholder returns. For-profit managers are more sensitive to performance
information since the negative/positive performance gap is directly related to their profits.
For-profit managers may be more likely to invest positive gains to expand market shares
for profitability, however, nonprofit, or public managers, are reluctant to invest positive
gains since the complex and ambiguous goals make it difficult to prioritize performance
goals.
Even if public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations have a similar degree of goal
clarity in delivering public services, the different extent of managerial autonomy may in-
fluence the use of performance information. If managers are restricted from changing man-
agerial actions, apparently they are less likely to employ performance information in their
strategy (Boyne and Chen 2007; Moynihan 2006). Moynihan and Pandey (2010) indicate
that administrative flexibility fosters the use of performance information. If managers have
the freedom to pursue process change, they may be more willing to get information from
performance data to find rationales for the changes. Public managers who receive a higher
level of political attention and oversight have less managerial discretion to adopt innova-
tions in work processes. The higher red-tape and hierarchy in bureaucracy limit public
managers? ability to change managerial strategy in response to performance information
(Boyne 2002). Nonprofit organizations have a relatively large number of shareholders
who impose rules and procedures when delivering public services, so that they have less
managerial autonomy to change strategy in a short-term period relative to for-profit orga-
nizations.
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Lastly, managers may employ performance information in management only if they ex-
pect high incentives regarding managerial actions (Hvidman and Andersen 2014). If there
is no incentive, managers may not care about performance information and are reluctant
to change what they have been doing in response to performance information (Boyne and
Chen 2007; Swiss 2005). Konisky and Teodoro (2015) contend that public and private
organizations have different compliant costs and incentives to follow regulation, thus the
effectiveness of regulation may differ across sectors. Public and nonprofit organizations
have less economic incentives to achieve performance goals relative to for-profit organi-
zations (Hirth 1997). Public and nonprofit organizations have public purposes or social
goals; their managers are less likely to be rewarded based on marginal profits than for-
profit managers are (Davies 1981). The lower economic incentive may decrease for public
and nonprofit managers to change strategy in response to performance information.
Hypothesis 3 The effect of performance information on strategy is contingent on sector.
For-profit organizations are more sensitive to performance information than public
or nonprofit organizations when they decide managerial strategy.
4.5 Empirical Evidence From U.S. Nursing Homes
This study explores how managers utilize performance information in their decisions
on managerial strategy using data on American nursing homes between the years 2011-
2013. American nursing homes provide a good empirical context to test the impact of
performance information. First, performance information of nursing homes is important
to policy makers and constituents due to increased public spending and the health care
quality issue; about 1.49 million residents and 2.5 million discharges received nursing
home care during 2008, and 71% of those residents use Medicare and Medicaid resources
(CDC National Center for Health Statistics-Nursing Home Current Residents June 2008).
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The elderly population , those over the age of 60, are estimated to be 26% of the U.S.
population by the year 2050 (Administration on Aging, 2010). Consequently, the pressure
on nursing home quality has increased, which requires managers to adopt performance-
based management strategies.
Second, despite the huge volume of public funding sources, about two-thirds of nursing
homes are for-profit (The National Nursing Home Survey 1999), and government-owned
homes are under intense pressure to privatize(Amirkhanyan, Kim and Lambright 2008).
Governments tend to decide to buy long-term care services from the private sector rather
than making it themselves; this is due to the assumption that public homes suffer from
red-tape, bureaucratic inefficiency and low quality compared to private homes (Lemke
and Moos 1989). As private for-profit nursing homes have been growing rapidly, it brings
up the unanswered question of whether public, nonprofit, and for-profit nursing homes are
fundamentally different in management. Without careful consideration of the impact of
ownership in the decision making process, the increased privatization and business-style
management in nursing homes may produce undesirable policy outcomes. Therefore, it is
necessary to explore whether public, nonprofit, and for-profit nursing home administrators
react differently to performance information in their decision making process, which may
result in different outcomes.
Third, American nursing homes have standardized performance indicators applied to
all Medicare certificated nursing homes regardless of ownership. State governments con-
duct annual health inspections of all certificated nursing homes in the United States to
assess facilities? quality based on 180 regulatory requirements set by Congress. Since
2008, the centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) transformed this assessment
as an intuitive performance indicator, a five-star rating, and posted the ratings for each
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nursing home online 1, in order to help residents and their families easily understand the
quality of nursing homes. Nursing home administrators may be sensitive to the changes
in this administrative assessment because the standardized quality index allows residents
and families to evaluate the quality of each nursing home relative to other nursing homes,
or one in a past year, which may significantly affect profitability. In addition, state Medi-
care can give warning to or terminate low-performing nursing homes from the market,
thus, nursing homes that heavily rely on Medicare reimbursement need to be alert to the
5-star-rating in every year. If any significant changes are noticed, administrators may use
the performance information in their managerial strategy. This standardized performance
indicator allows us to explore how public, nonprofit, and for-profit administrators adopt
different strategies in response to performance information.
4.6 Research Design
4.6.1 Data and Methods
For the dataset, I use the 2013 Nursing Home Administrative Survey, Nursing Home
Compare (NHC) data in 2010-2013, and 2010 Census data. The Nursing Home Adminis-
trative Survey provides information on managerial practices including managerial strate-
gies across public, nonprofit, and for-profit nursing homes. Since the number of U.S.
nursing homes is unbalanced across sectors - 69% of nursing facilities are private homes,
25% non-profit homes, and 6% public homes in 2013, the researchers selected a stratified
random sample from each sector-1,000 for-profit, 1,000 non-profit, and 903 public nursing
homes in order to make a representative sample. To increase response rates, Project for
Equity, Representation, and Governance (PERG) at Texas A&M University conducted a
three wave survey from January of 2013 to May of 2013 both online and by mail. A total
1visit www.medicare.gov/nursinghomecompare
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of 725 nursing home administrators responded (24.9% response rate), but for this study, I
analyze 714 homes ? 259 public, 254 nonprofit, and 201 private nursing homes ? due to
missing observations in managerial strategies.
Nursing Home Compare provides information for control variables, such as the num-
ber of certified beds, the number of staffs, occupancy, chain-affiliation, and the percentage
of residents who have special needs and ownership status. The data also provides organiza-
tional performance through a five-star overall quality rating score, reported by the Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). CMS reports the five-star overall quality rating
in each home on their website; the top 10 percent of homes in each state earned a five-star
rating, the middle 70 percent earn a rating of two, three, or four stars – approximately
23.3 percent in each rating category, and the bottom 20 percent earn a one-star rating.
Because all certified nursing homes participating are subject to be evaluation by Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the overall quality rating provides compre-
hensible information to residents and managers. Nursing home administrators recognize
the changes of overall ratings on the websites easily, anticipating that current and future
residents may move from home to home if the quality rating is significantly low. Thus, it
is credible to assume that the 5-star rating is a good performance indicator that produces
significant signals for managers to change strategy. I use 2010 Census data to control for
resident characteristics and environments.
For the data analysis, I use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model specification with
the consideration of cross-unit heterogeneity. I use factor-analyzed measures for manage-
rial strategy, prospecting and defending. Thus, the continuous dependent variable fits the
OLS assumptions. 2
2Since the dependent variables –prospecting and defending – are ordinal variables from 1 to 4, I also
analyze ordered probit model specifications for each strategy survey item to investigate whether the effect
of performance information differ across survey item. The results are consistent with ones in OLS model
specifications but show weak relationship.
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4.6.2 Dependent Variable: Managerial Strategy
The dependent variable in this research is managerial strategy. Following Miles and
Snow (1978)’s typology and Boyne andWalker (2004), I use two types of managerial strat-
egy, prospector and defender, by using Nursing Home Administrator survey. The Nursing
Home Administrative Survey provides responses to questions on what extent a chief man-
ager agree(s) or disagree(s) to adopt a certain type of strategy when they face opportunities
or risks, on a four-point scale in the range from ‘strongly disagree‘ to ‘strongly agree‘. To
make a common measurement, I weighed a point value from 1 to 4 on each answer choice,
and then created each strategy variable as the first factor derived from each factor analysis
using the percentage of respondents to questions.
For a prospecting strategy, I use questions that ask about administrator’s perspectives
on adoption of innovation and new ideas. I then factor-analyze the items separately. As
noted in Table 4.1, the three items related to innovation and new opportunities load on
a single factor with an eigenvalue of 2.24, indicating 74% of the total variance in these
items, which shows high internal reliability. It allows us to examine managers’ intended
strategy on initiating innovation, new ideas, and searching new opportunities that provide
substantially similar operational meaning for prospectors. The measure is consistent with
strategy content measures used in Andrews, Boyne, Law and Walker (2012); Meier et al.
(2007, 2010), who helped build the empirical evidence.
For defending strategy, I use five survey items related to consistent procedures, effi-
ciency, and buffering facilities from external environments. Miles and Snow (1978, p. 48)
define defenders as managers who chase efficiency in core tasks and strive to limit external
influence. Defenders have a conservative view of innovation, so they stress subordinates
to follow consistent procedures on core tasks for achieving efficiency. Thus, the five items
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contain all of the dimensions of a defender as Miles and Snow indicate, which increases
face validity. As noted in Table 4.1, the five items all loaded on a single factor with an
eigenvalue of 1.60.
Table 4.1: Measuring Organizational Strategies
1. Prospecting Indicators Factor Loading
Our nursing home is always among the first to adopt new tech-
nology and practices.
:87
We continually search for new opportunities to provide services
to our community.
:80
Our nursing home is always among the first to adopt new ideas
and practices
:91
Eigenvalues= 2:24
2. Defending Indicators Factor Loading
How important is the average cost per patient? :48
How important is financial performance for your nursing home? :47
I like to implement consistent policies and procedures in this
nursing home.
:27
I always try to limit the influence of external events on the staff
and nurses.
:69
I strive to control those factors outside the nursing home that
could have an effect on my organization.
:76
Eigenvalues= 1:60
4.6.3 Independent Variables: Performance Information and Ownership
As a key independent variable, I use a five-star overall quality rating to tab performance
information relative to aspiration levels. The five-star overall quality rating includes health
inspection, the number of deficiencies and the number of repeat revisits of Medicare staff
who monitor the improvement of deficiencies, staff quality, and quality measures based on
Minimum Data Set (MDS) 3.0 resident assessments. Each of three categories has its own
five-star rating that indicates the multi-dimensional quality of nursing homes. CMS con-
structed the overall quality five-star quality rating based on three categories as following.
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1) They start with a health inspection five-star rating, 2) they add one star to the first rating
if a staffing rating is greater than a health inspection rating, or subtract one star if staffing
is one star. However, an overall rating cannot be more than five stars or less than one star.
3) They add one star to the second rating if MDS quality measure rating is five stars, or
subtract one star if MDS quality measure rating is one star. 4) If the health inspection
rating is one star, then other two measures, staffing or quality measure, cannot upgrade
the overall quality rating. The composition rule of overall quality measure covers three
dimensions, but highly concentrates on health inspection dimensions. The overall five-star
rating is applied to all certified nursing homes regardless of ownership.
I measure performance information into two ways: 1) the gap between ratings in the
current year, 2013, and ratings in the previous year, 2012, the historical aspiration, and 2)
the gap between ratings in each nursing home and the average rating of the county, the
social aspiration. The first one indicates how nursing homes improve their quality relative
to past years, and the latter one reveals whether nursing homes have higher quality relative
to other competing homes in the county, on average. Both performance information mea-
sures are consistent with the conceptual meaning in Meier, Favero and Zhu (2015). The
descriptive analysis (see Appendix C) indicate that performance information varies across
nursing homes and seems normally distributed.
I measure ownership as a dummy variable for public, nonprofit, and for-profit nursing
homes. As noted in Table 4.2, American nursing homes vary across ownership. Since all
nursing homes are funded by Medicare/Medicaid and received substantive regulations on
delivering services, ownership is a distinct factor used to differentiate sector-differences.
Moreover, the increased pressures on privatization and business management require em-
pirical evidence on whether ownership makes a difference in performance and manage-
ment. By using an ownership dummy variable, I focus on how public, nonprofit, and
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Table 4.2: U.S. Nursing Homes across Ownership
Type of Ownership Freq.
Government - City 26
Government - City/county 18
Government - County 134
Government - Hospital district 40
Government - State 41
Non profit - Church related 50
Non profit - Corporation 189
Non profit - Other 15
For profit - Corporation 168
For profit - Individual 13
For profit - Limited liability company 2
For profit - Partnership 18
total 714
for-profit managers adopt managerial strategies differently in response to performance in-
formation.
4.6.4 Control Variables
I include several control variables in the models to explore the unique influence of
performance information on strategy. Chain-affiliation or hospital-affiliation determines
the degree of independence, managerial discretion, and shared resources. A centralized
structure in chain-or hospital-affiliated nursing homes creates a hierarchical command
process that limits managers’ ability to change managerial strategy (Amirkhanyan, Kim
and Lambright 2008; Hodge and Piccolo 2005). On the other hands, chain or hospital-
affiliated nursing homes have more shared resources that may push administrators to adopt
prospecting strategies regardless of performance information. The adoptive strategic plan-
ning literature indicates that fiscal resources can be a condition that managers use to exploit
new opportunities and innovation (Berry 1994). Even if they perform poorly in the past,
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for examples, chain or hospital-affiliated nursing homes can utilize slack resources, such
as shared personnel (e.g. nurses or doctors) or monetary resources through affiliation to
adjust capacity (Anderson et al. 2003).
Table 4.3: The Summary of Control Variable Measurement
Variable Operational Definition/Measurement Sources
Chain affiliated
Chain-affiliated nursing homes; Dummy vari-
able (1= yes, 0=no)
NHC 2013
Hospital affiliated
Networked with hospital; Dummy variable (1=
yes, 0=no)
NHC 2013
Occupancy
The total number of residents divided by the to-
tal beds
NHC 2013
Organizational size Total number of beds NHC 2013
Managerial capacity
The number of nurses (registered and voca-
tional nurses) per a resident
NHC 2013
Task difficulty
The sum of squared of the number of residents
dependent on staffs in terms of transferring, toi-
let, eating, continence, mobility, skin integrity,
mental status, and loosing weight (Herfindal in-
dex)
NHC 2013
Tenure
Average tenure of a chief manager in a current
nursing home
PERG Executive
Survey 2013
Elderly
Proportion of population in elderly (65 years or
order) in the county
Census 2010
Medicaid resident The percentage of Medicaid residents NHC 2013
Market competition
The sum of squared market shares for all facili-
ties in the county (Herfindal index)
NHC 2013
Organizational size, occupancy, and managerial capacity produce slack resources and
buffering zones that may influence the impact of performance information on strategy.
When organizations are capable to buffer consequences of negative performance infor-
mation, the impact of performance information can be minimal. I include task difficulty
and the percentage of Medicaid residents to control for the factors in resident-side. When
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nursing homes have residents who need special treatments and cares, staff may need to
put more time and resources to take care of those residents. In addition, a large number of
Medicaid residents who heavily rely on government funds, not out-of-pocket money, may
affect managerial strategy to exploit or buffer external environment. In terms of environ-
mental factors, I also control for the percent of elderly people and market competition that
may lead managers to exploit opportunity to expand market shares in competitive markets.
The specific measurement of control variables are described in table 4.3.
4.7 Empirical Findings
For descriptive analysis, I first analyze a cross-sectional correlation between perfor-
mance information and strategy. As noted in Appendix D, prospecting and defending
strategies are positively associated with performance information, but the size of impact
is relatively small. The correlation analysis also indicates that prospecting and defending
strategies are positively correlated each other, which supports Boyne and Walker (2004)
that prospecting and defending are not mutually exclusive.
To explore the individual effects of historical and social aspiration, I include historical
and social aspiration performance information separately in each strategy model. In terms
of prospecting strategies, Table 4.4 shows that both historical and social aspiration are pos-
itively associated with prospecting. Nursing home administrators are more likely to exploit
opportunities by adopting innovations when they perform better than other competing or-
ganizations and past years. This finding supports my first hypothesis that performance
information increases prospecting at an increasing rate.
In terms of defending strategies, I analyze two models, a linear and a non-linear model,
to examine whether performance information has a linear or an inverted U-shape relation-
ship with defending strategies. Table 4.5 shows that historical aspiration is positively asso-
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Table 4.4: The Impact of Performance Information on Prospecting Strategy: All Nursing
Homes
DV: Prospecting 1 2
b/se b/se
Historical Aspiration PI 0.068+
(0.04)
Social Aspiration PI 0.097*
(0.04)
In chain 0.371** 0.375**
(0.09) (0.09)
In hospital -0.129 -0.114
(0.13) (0.13)
Occupancy 0.003 0.002
(0.00) (0.00)
Size 0.002** 0.002**
(0.00) (0.00)
Capacity -0.097 -0.113
(0.11) (0.09)
Task Difficulty 0.177 0.294
(0.52) (0.54)
Elderly 0.009 0.012
(0.01) (0.01)
Tenure 0.018** 0.018**
(0.01) (0.01)
market competition 0.133 0.112
(0.17) (0.17)
(constant) -0.856* -0.902**
(0.35) (0.34)
R-Squared overall 0.0709 0.0718
N 572 583
Notes: Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. Clustered by districts
+p< 0:10;p< 0:05; p< 0:01; two-tailed test
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Table 4.5: The Impact of Performance Information on Defending Strategy: All Nursing
Homes
DV: Defending 1 2
b/se b/se
Historical Aspiration PI 0.073+
(0.04)
Social Aspiration PI -0.004
(0.04)
In chain 0.063 0.058
(0.09) (0.09)
In hospital -0.128 -0.101
(0.14) (0.14)
Occupancy -0.002 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00)
Size 0.002** 0.002**
(0.00) (0.00)
Capacity -0.272** -0.270**
(0.09) (0.09)
Task Difficulty -0.577 -0.695
(0.44) (0.46)
Elderly -0.020+ -0.018
(0.01) (0.01)
Tenure 0.001 0.001
(0.01) (0.01)
market competition 0.326+ 0.249
(0.17) (0.17)
(constant) 0.375 0.374
(0.29) (0.29)
R-Squared overall 0.0384 0.0294
N 560 570
Notes: Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. Clustered by districts
+p< 0:10;p< 0:05; p< 0:01; two-tailed test
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Table 4.6: Testing Non-linear Relationship between Performance Information and De-
fending Strategy: All Nursing Homes
DV: Defending 1 2
b/se b/se
Historical Aspiration PI 0.076+
(0.04)
Squared (Historical AspirationPI) -0.009
(0.02)
Social Aspiration PI -0.003
(0.04)
Squared (Social Aspiration PI) 0.027
(0.03)
In chain 0.064 0.061
(0.09) (0.09)
In hospital -0.128 -0.100
(0.14) (0.14)
Occupancy -0.002 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00)
Size 0.002** 0.001**
(0.00) (0.00)
Capacity -0.266** -0.269**
(0.10) (0.09)
Task Difficulty -0.577 -0.701
(0.44) (0.46)
Elderly -0.020+ -0.017
(0.01) (0.01)
Tenure 0.001 0.001
(0.01) (0.01)
market competition 0.328+ 0.293
(0.17) (0.18)
(constant) 0.381 0.321
(0.29) (0.30)
R-Squared overall 0.0386 0.0304
N 560 570
Notes: Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. Clustered by districts
+p< 0:10;p< 0:05; p< 0:01; two-tailed test
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ciated with defending strategies whereas social aspiration is not significant. Managers are
more concerned about historical aspiration when they decide to use a defending strategy.
Once they perceive better performance information relative to the previous year, managers
are more likely to have a consistent procedure and buffer the external environments to
focus on core tasks that they have been doing well. Table 4.6 indicates that there is no
non-linear relationship between performance, information, and defending in both histori-
cal and social aspiration. Even after putting squared performance information, the findings
indicate that historical aspirations still have a positive linear relationship with defending.
The findings partially support my second hypothesis that performance information is pos-
itively related to defending strategy, but the relationship looks linear and exists in only
historical aspirations. This finding reveals that managers are more likely to focus on core
tasks, and take incremental changes in procedure when they perform better than the previ-
ous year.
Table 4.7: ANOVA Test: Prospecting across Ownership
D ownership mean std.dev freq.
Public -0.059 0.980 221
Nonprofit -0.012 1.018 225
Private 0.089 0.999 178
total 624
ANOVA Test F Prob F
Between groups 1.13 0.3240
Within groups
Then, how does the relationship look across sectors? To analyze the effect of sector-
difference in strategy, I first conducted an ANOVA analysis. As Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 in-
dicate, ownership makes a statistical difference in defending strategies, but not in prospect-
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Table 4.8: ANOVA Test: Defending across Ownership
D ownership mean std.dev freq.
Public 0.099 0.961 217
Nonprofit -0.133 1.026 218
Private 0.042 1.000 175
total 610
ANOVA Test F Prob F
Between groups 3.20 0.041
Within groups
ing strategies. Table 4.8 shows that nonprofit nursing homes are less likely to take de-
fending strategy relative to public and for-profit homes and that difference is statistically
significant (F-value=3.20, p-value ¡0.04). It indicates that nonprofit nursing homes have
different characteristics that result in different management actions. Amirkhanyan, Kim
and Lambright (2008) indicate that nonprofit nursing homes focus on the third-party insur-
ance residents and are less likely to accept Medicaid residents. The resident characteristics
in each sector can make a different strategy, thus it is necessary to test whether the effect
of performance information is leveraged by sector-difference when deciding a manage-
rial strategy. 3. How does ownership leverage the effect of performance information on
strategy? For prospecting strategy, Table 4.9 indicates that public and nonprofit organi-
zations have a negative relationship with prospecting relative to for-profit nursing homes.
(For-profit homes are baseline) For-profit managers are more likely to adopt a prospecting
strategy when they perform better than other competing nursing homes or better than the
previous year. However, public and nonprofit managers do not change strategy in response
to performance information regardless of whether it comes from historical aspirations or
social aspirations. The findings support my third hypothesis that the effect of performance
3To explore whether there is any other leverage effect between performance information and strategy, ex-
cept sector-difference, I conducted interaction models with Medicaid residents and with market competition
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information on strategy is contingent on sectors. As figure 4.1 indicates, for-profit man-
agers are more likely to adopt a prospecting strategy, about 0.22 standard deviations, when
their social or historical performance information is increased by a one-star rating. How-
ever, the marginal effect is only significant in for-profit nursing homes. Nonprofit and
public managers do not have statistically different strategies in response to performance
information.
Figure 4.1: TheMarginal Effect of Performance Information on Prospecting across Sectors
Historical PI
Social PI
-.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Public Nonprofit
Forprofit
In defending strategies, the findings are consistent. Table 4.10 shows that the effect
of performance information on strategy is only significant when it comes to historical
aspiration. Interestingly, in terms of defending strategies, the sector-difference is consis-
tently important; for-profit managers are more likely to adopt defending strategies, but
the relationship is enforced more when they perform better than previously. If we look at
the marginal effect of performance information across all sectors, Figure 4.2 shows that
for-profit managers adopt defending strategies, about 0.20 standard deviations, when their
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Table 4.9: Interaction Models: The Impact of Performance Information on Prospecting
Strategy across Sectors
DV:Prospecting 1 2
Baseline: For-profit Nursing Homes b/se b/se
Nonprofit -0.049 -0.094
(0.11) (0.11)
Public -0.060 -0.068
(0.11) (0.11)
Historical Aspiration PI 0.207**
(0.08)
Nonprofit  Historical Aspiration PI -0.179+
(0.10)
Public  Historical Aspiration PI -0.216*
(0.10)
Social Aspiration PI 0.197**
(0.06)
Nonprofit  Social Aspiration PI -0.119
(0.09)
Public  Social Aspiration PI -0.179+
(0.10)
In chain 0.367** 0.356**
(0.09) (0.09)
In hospital -0.099 -0.092
(0.13) (0.13)
Occupancy 0.003 0.003
(0.00) (0.00)
Size 0.002** 0.002**
(0.00) (0.00)
Capacity -0.065 -0.112
(0.11) (0.09)
Task Difficulty 0.184 0.215
(0.51) (0.55)
Elderly 0.009 0.013
(0.01) (0.01)
Tenure 0.018** 0.018**
(0.01) (0.01)
market competition 0.162 0.087
(0.18) (0.17)
(constant) -0.851* -0.846*
(0.35) (0.35)
R-Squared overall 0.0811 0.0782
N 572 583
Notes: Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. For-profit homes are baseline
+p< 0:10;p< 0:05; p< 0:01; two-tailed test
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rating increases by one-star relative to the previous year. However, this relationship cannot
be found in social aspiration. The findings also support my third hypothesis that for-profit
managers are the only ones who adopt defending strategies when they perform better than
previous years. Nonprofit and public managers do not change strategy in response to per-
formance information.
Figure 4.2: The Marginal Effect of Performance Information on Defending across Sectors
Historical PI
Social PI
-.2 0 .2 .4
Public Nonprofit
Forprofit
The findings provide an interesting insight into the different organizational charac-
teristics across sectors, such as goal clarity, incentive, and managerial discretion; these
characteristics may produce different extents of motivation for managers to adopt strate-
gies. For-profit managers, who are highly concerned about market-share and profitability,
have to closely monitor whether they have been doing well relative to other nursing homes
or the previous year, and then try to employ the information in management. A high eco-
nomic incentive and a greater extent of managerial discretion may also allow for-profit
managers to exploit the opportunity to expand market shares. The economic or promo-
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Table 4.10: Interaction Models: The Impact of Performance Information on Defending
Strategy across Sectors
DV:Defending 1 2
Baseline: For-profit Nursing Homes b/se b/se
Nonprofit -0.350** -0.369**
(0.11) (0.11)
Public -0.264* -0.260*
(0.11) (0.12)
Historical Aspiration PI 0.202**
(0.08)
Nonprofit Historical Aspiration PI -0.188+
(0.10)
Public Historical Aspiration PI -0.189+
(0.10)
Social Aspiration PI 0.076
(0.06)
Nonprofit Social Aspiration PI -0.066
(0.09)
Public Social Aspiration PI -0.136
(0.11)
In chain 0.013 -0.001
(0.09) (0.09)
In hospital -0.044 -0.033
(0.15) (0.14)
Occupancy -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00)
Size 0.002** 0.001**
(0.00) (0.00)
Capacity -0.246** -0.271**
(0.09) (0.09)
Task Difficulty -0.759+ -0.913+
(0.45) (0.47)
Elderly -0.017 -0.014
(0.01) (0.01)
Tenure 0.002 0.002
(0.01) (0.01)
market competition 0.327+ 0.225
(0.18) (0.18)
(constant) 0.524+ 0.541+
(0.29) (0.29)
R-Squared overall 0.0667 0.0510
N 560 570
Notes: Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. Clustered by districts
+p< 0:10;p< 0:05; p< 0:01; two-tailed test
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tional incentives based on performance are another key motivator for for-profit managers
to pursue prospecting strategies, while bearing a risk of failure. Contrastingly, nonprofit
and public managers who have less incentive, discretion, and goal clarity are reluctant
to change their strategies solely based on performance information. Interestingly, in the
context of nursing home management, non-profit and public managers are not statistically
different in adopting strategies in response to performance information.
4.8 Conclusion
Managerial strategies, prospecting and defending, have received attention from pub-
lic management scholars due to the belief that strategies ensure better performance. Yet,
there is no prior study on the reverse relationship between management and performance.
In this research, I theorize that managers perceive performance information by analyzing
whether current performance is satisfactory or not relative to aspiration points. Using a
theory of reference dependence, I contend that historical aspirations and social aspirations
are key reference points that generate performance information. Such performance in-
formation may motivate managers to pursue either prospecting and defending strategies;
positive performance information may be associated with prospecting strategies, whereas,
negative performance information may have an inverted U-shape relationship with defend-
ing strategies. These relationship between performance information and strategy, however,
may be contingent on sectors because of different incentives, discretion, and goal clarity.
The findings provide interesting empirical evidence that there is a reversed causal re-
lationship between management and performance. In a cyclical process, performance
information, generated through historical and social aspiration, determines management
actions taken. The findings indicate that positive social aspiration pushes managers to ex-
ploit opportunities through innovations. Positive historical aspiration also leads managers
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to adopt defending strategy –focusing on core tasks and operating efficiency using consis-
tent procedures. The findings partially support the theory that performance information is
associated with strategy, and offers interesting theoretical and practical implications.
First, findings indicate that prospecting and defending strategies are not mutually ex-
clusive. Against my second hypothesis, the findings show that positive performance in-
formation increases both prospecting and defending strategies at an increasing rate. It
supports Boyne and Walker (2004)’s theory that successful managers try to adopt new
ideas, but at the same time, they preserve actions, which lead to successful core tasks.
The findings also support other studies that claim all managers are analyzers at some point
when they have multiple tasks (Walker 2013)
Second, findings indicate that managers perceive performance information differently
across aspiration points. Social aspiration is more significant when adopting a prospect-
ing strategy, whereas historical aspiration is more important when adopting a defending
strategy. This finding gives an insight about the process of perceptual performance in-
formation. Managers may obtain different signals and motivations from social or his-
torical aspiration. Olsen (2013) investigates this difference between social and historical
aspiration. His findings indicate that social aspiration has more influence on managerial
decisions than historical aspiration, which suggests that signals of social and historical as-
piration might be different. Meier, Favero and Zhu (2015) also contend that all aspects of
aspiration points are necessarily incorporated into a complex model of prior expectation.
The findings require investigating the underlying mechanisms of how managers construct
performance information through different aspiration points. If we compare the gaps be-
tween perceptual performance information and administrative performance information in
various performance dimensions, the findings may help to find the cognitive mechanism
in performance information.
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Third, the findings reveal that the relationship between strategy and performance is
contingent on sectors. Even after I control for organizational and environmental factors,sector-
difference is still a major factor in the relationship. It indicates that ownership may have a
unique function that affects the cognitive process of receiving performance information, or
the process of applying performance information into strategy. Organization theory litera-
ture contends that different incentives, goal clarity, and managerial discretion across sec-
tors generate different motivations to employ performance information on strategy (Rainey
2009; Rainey and Bozeman 2000; Hvidman and Andersen 2014). This study requires fu-
ture research on what factors actually generate the effect. Another interesting finding in
this study is that nonprofit and public nursing homes are not different in adopting strategies
in response to performance information. What makes nonprofit nursing homes similar to
public nursing homes in adopting strategies? What factors make a difference between the
for-profit and non-profit sector? These questions still need to be unpacked, analyzed, and
answered.
Finally, this study indicates that performance information is important in managerial
decision, but public, nonprofit, and for-profit managers can interpret the information dif-
ferently. Without considering sector-differences, we may find the effect of performance
information in all the wrong places. Moynihan (2008a) contends that performance infor-
mation is not determined but generated through interactive dialogue among actors. If pub-
lic, nonprofit, and for-profit nursing homes have different political entities, shareholders,
managers, and clientele, the same star-rating performance can be differently interpreted.
These findings suggest that we need to consider sector-differences seriously when evalu-
ating management and performance.
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5. CONCLUSION
One of the enduring debates in public administration is how to ensure the quality of
public services. As public demand of public services increases, governments reform public
organizations by evaluating the results of activities based on a standardized performance
index. Such performance-based management has been a movement in public service de-
livery with a belief that performance information ensures the quality of public services.
(Radin 2006). Governments require public service managers to report their strategic goals,
targets, and goal-attainment, which produce massive amounts of performance information
(Kettl and Kelman 2007). Public management theory assumes that such performance in-
formation improves the quality of public services (Moynihan 2008b), yet it is understudied
how managers utilize performance information when making decisions.
Healthcare services have received significant attention from the public and policy mak-
ers due to the growing demand, expenditures and political pressures. Hospitals and nursing
homes are major health care institutions that receive a large amount of Medicare and Med-
icaid funding. After initiating the Affordable Care Act, the government is more concerned
with the quality of hospitals and nursing homes. With a growing demand for healthcare
and a decrease in public funding, more nonprofit and for-profit organizations will be left
with the impression that they outperform public healthcare institutions. Privatization and
business management are pushing this notion that private-like organizations ensure bet-
ter quality for less money (Kamensky 1996). However, there have been a few empirical
studies on how public, nonprofit and for-profit healthcare institutions are different in man-
agerial actions and performance.
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In this dissertation, I seek to explore how managers utilize performance information
when deciding networking or their strategy. I also examine how sector-differences leverage
the relationship between performance and management. The first article finds that public,
nonprofit and for-profit hospitals are fundamentally different in performance. When orga-
nizational performance goals have a trade-off relationship that is not compatible, public,
nonprofit and for-profit managers prioritize goals differently. Even after controlling for
other organizational and environmental factor, ownership still produces a significant dif-
ference in performance. Public hospitals have higher customer satisfaction with low oper-
ating efficiency, whereas for-profit hospitals have higher efficiency at the loss of customer
satisfaction. The findings contribute to the understanding on how sector-differences are
important in organizational performance. The second article provides empirical evidence
that performance information influences managerial networking nodes. The findings in-
dicate that there is a reverse-causal relationship between performance and networking.
Managers choose a networking node based on whether they perform better than a ref-
erence point, historical aspiration or social aspiration. The third article finds that perfor-
mance information influences managerial strategy, either prospecting or defending; I found
that positive performance information increases both prospecting and defending strategies.
Positive performance information may produce slack resources and trust from upper-level
agencies, which prompts managers to exploit opportunities. However, my research shows
that the effect of performance information on strategy is contingent on sectors.
5.1 Seeking Causal Claims in Management and Performance: Theoretical Implications
This research contributes to the understanding of the causal relationship between man-
agement and performance. The second and the third article revisits classic management
theories, and explore how performance influence managerial actions in turn. The findings
indicate that managerial actions are determined by personnel characteristics or organiza-
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tional factors. Managerial actions are generated through a cyclical process between per-
formance and management. Managers analyze their winning points or failing points by
comparing current performance to past performance, or the average performance of other
competing organizations, then they apply this information when making decisions. My
research supports the performance management literature (Moynihan 2008b) that perfor-
mance information is important to shape managerial practices.
The findings provide theoretical implications that managers perceive performance in-
formation differently across aspiration points. In chapter 4, social aspiration is more sig-
nificant when adopting a prospecting strategy, whereas historical aspiration is more impor-
tant for adopting defending strategy. These results support existing literature that managers
perceive different signals and motivations from social or historical aspiration (Olsen 2013).
The research reveals the underlying mechanism of how managers construct performance
information through different aspiration points.
My findings indicate that there is a reverse-causal relationship between management
and performance, which brings up more unanswered questions. The articles employ ob-
jective performance information, a five-star rating scale, to measure performance infor-
mation with an assumption that managers are sensitive to the standardized performance
index. However, we do not know whether there is a difference between perceptual per-
formance information and administrative assessment. Due to the organizational or en-
vironmental factors, managers may perceive administrative assessment differently based
on their perspectives, values and priorities on performance. If managers have lower val-
ues and priorities on quality of healthcare services, for example, a lower performance in
administrative assessment may not be important to managers. As Moynihan (2008a) con-
tends, in this context, objective performance can be differently interpreted by managers.
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Following studies need to ask whether there is a systematic difference between perceptual
performance information and objective performance information.
5.2 Speaking to the U.S. Healthcare Systems: Practical Implications
Using U.S. hospitals and nursing homes, the findings provide empirical evidence on
whether sector-difference is important in management and performance. The first article
finds that customer satisfaction, responsiveness to policy recipients, can be achieved by
public hospitals. This finding gives an insight to policy makers that public and private dis-
tinctions affect performance. If public managers are more responsive to patients, the high
customer satisfaction can improve the quality of hospital care, which is linked to overall
health outcomes. In addition, this article gives an implication that performance goals are
not always compatible. Competing goals produce different incentives and managerial pri-
ority. Policy makers need to consider these sector-distinctions seriously when designing
performance evaluations, especially when there is a trade-off relationship among perfor-
mance goals.
The findings also suggest that the context of the health care industry needs to be con-
sidered. Hospitals and nursing homes have various performance goals they like to achieve
simultaneously. This goal complexity may produce different motivations to employ per-
formance information on managerial actions across sectors. Thus, policy makers need
to consider which performance dimensions should be used when measuring performance
information across sectors. If policy makers aim to increase the quality of health care ser-
vices, they need to carefully examine incentives and punishments for each performance
indicator.
Last, this research finds that the effect of performance information on strategy is only
significant in for-profit nursing homes, whereas there is no difference between the public
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and nonprofit sectors. Ownership has a unique function that affects the process of apply-
ing performance information into strategy. The different incentives, goal clarity, and man-
agerial discretion across sectors may generate different motives to employ performance
information on strategy. Even if managers receive similar performance information, the
decisions that each manager makes can be different. My findings provide an interesting
insight into Medicare staff who evaluate nursing homes, and that the effectiveness of a
standardized performance index may differ across sectors.
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS FOR THE SECTION 2
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Customer Satisfaction 0 1 -3.686 3.946
Standardized Efficiency 0.032 0.988 -8.932 1.727 995
Log(Outpatients) 11.805 0.954 5.394 14.946 995
Log(Adjusted Inpatient Days 11.455 0.682 8.894 13.607
995
Log (Physicians per Bed) 0.065 0.1 0 0.847 995
Log (Nurses per Bed) 0.697 0.265 0.053 1.453 995
Log (Doctors per Nurse) 0.067 0.091 0 0.639 995
Skilled Nurses 0.374 0.065 0.099 0.492 995
Log(Market Competition) 5.103 1.842 0 7.279 995
Chain Affiliation 0.107 0.309 0 1 995
Network Affiliation 0.375 0.484 0 1 995
year 2008.481 0.5 2008 2009 995
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APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS FOR THE SECTION 3
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables:Networking
Corporate Office 374 3.776388 1.188263 0 5
Other Staff 712 4.803629 0.6152364 0 5
Residents 713 4.67932 0.7467853 0 5
Regulatory Agency 711 1.365718 0.5917662 0 4
Medicaid 678 1.52012 1.062743 0 5
Vendors 636 1.519784 1.070285 0 5
Insurance 668 1.745298 1.221925 0 5
Key Independent Variables
rule compliance information
historical short-term PI 714 0.2366947 5.604671 -29 35
historical long-term PI 707 -0.0777935 5.776616 -27 23
social PI 714 6.51E-09 4.587125 -24.2 9.666
Market-value Performance Information
historical short-term PI 714 0.1755686 1.022237 -3 3
historical long-term PI 714 -0.0476541 0.8860526 -3 3
social PI 714 -1.67E-09 0.5239835 -3 2
Controls
Size 714 88.7042 67.8714 2 694
Occupancy 714 0.8467414 0.163255 0.0352 3.093
Task Difficulty 714 0.143724 0.0880284 0.0136 0.8182
Capacity 714 0.282356 0.2756689 0 5.5706
In Hospital 714 0.1162465 0.320745 0 1
In Chain 714 0.35154 0.4777861 0 1
Urban 714 59.049 32.8561 0 100
Elderly 714 15.82686 4.162717 6.8 36
Market Competition 714 0.2804983 0.2986759 0.0025 1
Tenure 714 7.134622 7.153543 0 38
Prospector 714 6.08E-09 1 -3.069 1.9478
Defender 714 2.00E-10 1 -2.407 2.1249
Ownership (dummy) 714 1.967787 0.7981914 1 3
Public 239
Nonprofit 259
For-profit 216
Notes: There are some missing observations in each node because some nursing homes are not applicable to contact
a certain type of networking node (i.e. corporate office).
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APPENDIX C: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS FOR THE SECTION 4
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
DV: Managerial Strategy
Prospector 0 1 -2.928 1.867 624
Defender 0 1 -3.145 2.332 609
IV: Performance Information (PI)
Historical aspiration PI 0.165 1.027 -3 3 695
Social aspiration PI 0.187 1.003 -2.879 3 707
Ownership (dummy) 714 1.967787 0.7981914 1 3
Public 239
Nonprofit 259
For-profit 216
Controls
In Chain 0.352 0.478 0 1 714
In Hospital 0.116 0.321 0 1 714
Occupancy 84.779 16.074 4 303 714
Size 88.704 68.063 2 694 710
Capacity 0.282 0.276 0 5.571 710
Task Difficulty 0.144 0.088 0.014 0.818 714
Elderly 15.827 4.174 6.8 36 710
tenure 7.135 7.391 0 38 669
Medicaid Resident 50.683 33.632 1 108 714
Market Competition 0.28 0.299 0.003 1 714
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APPENDIX D: CROSS-CORRELATION TABLE FOR SECTION 4.6
Variables 1 2 3 4
1. Prospecting 1.00
2. Defending 0.23 1.00
(0.00)
3. Historical Aspiration PI(t-1) 0.06 0.07 1.00
(0.14) (0.08)
4. Social Aspiration PI 0.08 0.01 0.34 1.00
(0.05) (0.76) (0.00)
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